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I. INTRODUCTION

This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 2000 through June 30,
2001 especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the
real estate practitioner. The legislative changes affect numerous provisions.
So, the legislation comments included in this review are purely for
informational purposes. We do not intend this to be all inclusive. Reading
the complete amendments is highly recommended.
II. AGENCY
Lensa Corp. v. Poinciana Gardens Ass'n. 1 The issue in this case is
whether apparent authority can be established when the president of a non2
profit corporation negotiates and executes the sale of property.
In this case, the president of an association negotiated and executed
sales documents. The purchaser relied on the president's alleged apparent
authority and failed to comply with statutory requirements which require a
corporate resolution.4
The appellate court held that the sale of all or substantially all of a nonprofit corporation's assets is strictly controlled by section 617.1202 of the
Florida Statutes providing that a vote by the members must take place
authorizing the transaction. 5 Therefore, the purchaser was wrong in relying
on the president's position because of this statute. Also, it appears the
corporate principal never made a representation that the president was its
6
agent for this sale. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision disallowing the sale.7
Ill. ARBITRATION
8

Zager Plumbing, Inc. v. JP1 National Construction, Inc. The issue
here is whether the trial court erred in finding that a contractor did not waive
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297-98.
Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
Id.
785 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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its right to arbitration when it filed an action to shorten the time in which a
construction9 lien could be foreclosed prior to making a demand for
arbitration.
JPI National Construction ("JPr'), a general contractor, entered into a
subcontract with Zager Plumbing, which contained an arbitration clause. 0
When it was not paid timely, Zager filed a construction lien against the
owner's property, and JPI filed a complaint under section 713.21(4) of the
FloridaStatutes." Under this statute, the lienor has twenty days to show
cause why its lien should not be enforced by action or vacated and canceled
12
1
of record. Failure to respond timely results in an order canceling the lien.' 3
Attached to the complaint was JPI's demand for arbitration, which was
submitted to the American Arbitration Association simultaneously with the
filing of the complaint. 14 Zager filed a motion to dismiss contending that JPI
section 713.21.15 The trial
waived its right to arbitration by filing suit under
16
court denied the motion, and Zager appealed.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that there was no waiver
of the right to arbitration. Public policy is not only in favor of the prompt
clearance of construction liens from real property, it also strongly favors
arbitration.' 8 "All questions concerning the scope or waiver of the right to
arbitrate under contracts should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather
than against it."'19
In this case, JPI acted reasonably when it invoked expedited procedure
for clearing liens from real property, while at the same time seeking to
resolve the parties' dispute through arbitration.20 Zager was not prejudiced
by the trial c6urt's decision to allow the procedure.2'

9.
10.

Id. at 661.
Id.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.(quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1999)).
Zager Plumbing,Inc., 785 So. 2d at 661 (quoting FLA. STAT.
Id.
Id.
Id.

17.
18.

Id. at 661-62.

19.

§ 713.21(4) (1999)).

Zager Plumbing,Inc., 785 So. 2d at 662.
Id. (quoting Beverly Hills Dev. Corp. v. George Wimpey of Fla., Inc., 661 So. 2d

969, 971 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
20. Id. at 662.
21. Id.
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IV. ATrORNEY'S FEES
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Department of Transportation.22
The
Department
took
a
temporary
construction
easement
to
facilitate
bridge
repairs. 23 It made an offer of $112,300 to compensate the landowner.2 The
landowner's reaction to the offer was to hire a lawyer. 25 Eventually, the
landowner agreed to accept $142,000 as compensation and filed a motion for
attorney's fees. 26 By statute, attorney's fees in eminent domain cases are
27
based on the benefits the lawyer achieved for the client. Monetary benefits
are defined as the difference between the compensation the client receives
and the last written offer received from the condemning authority.28 The trial
court awarded attorney's fees as thirty-three percent of the difference
between $142,000 and $112,300.29
The landowner's attorney claimed that
3
was inadequate and appealed. 0
The appeal was based on two claims. First, the landowner claimed that
its attorney had achieved nonmonetary benefits by making the Department
change its plans. 3'

However, the district court found that the trial court's

decision was supported by competent substantial evidence on the record. 32 A
trial court's award of attorney's fees should be disturbed only if the trial
court
clearly abused its discretion.3 3 Consequently, that claim was reject4
ed.

3

The second claim was more interesting. The landowner had filed a
motion to strike the Department's offer of $112,300. 35 Without that offer,
the attorney's fees would be based on achieving the benefit of $142,000, so
the award would be significantly higher.36 The basis for the motion was that
the Department had subsequently made substantial changes to its plans, so
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

788 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(l) (1999).
§ 73.092(1)(a).
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277.
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 278.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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the original offer involved a different taking and could not, logically, be used
to measure the benefits achieved here. 37 The district court rejected that
argument. 38 The landowner's attorney claimed the benefit it had achieved
was "a substantial reduction in [Landowner's] costs to cure, a lesser impact
upon [Landowner's] property, and an entitlement to greater compensation. 3 9
Thus, the benefit achieved had already been used in calculating the
attorney's
fees, and it would be getting a windfall to increase those fees even
40
more.
Dow v. McKinley.41 Landowners hired a contractor to build their
single-family house. 42 A dispute arose and the landowners refused to honor
the contractor's final invoice.43 The contractor filed this suit for damages
based on, inter alia, breach of contract and to foreclose its mechanic's lien."
The landowners raised four affirmative defenses and three counterclaims
based substantially on allegations of faulty workmanship. 45 The trial court
granted judgment in favor of the contractor, but also granted judgment for
the landowners on their counterclaim." The court also entered an order for
attorney's fees under the construction lien statute. 47
The net award to the contractor was $16,026.98, but the court awarded
attorney's fees of $62,125 based on 355 hours at $175 per hour.48 The court
of appeal decided that this was erroneous. 49 The critical factor was that the
contractor had won less than thirty percent of his original claim of
$56,086.87.'o Consequently, the trial court should have considered whether
the attorney's fee should be reduced based on the level of success, a low
level in this case, achieved by the attorney.51 The district court also found
several items for which costs should not have been awarded including an

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 277.
Id. at 278.
776 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Dow, 776 So. 2d at 1018.
ld. (citing FLA.STAT. § 713.29 (1997)).
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Dow, 776 So. 2d at 1018.
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appraisal report, which was not submitted into evidence, and trial transcripts,
whose use and purpose was not established. 52
5 3 Plaintiff in an eminent
Hartleb v. Department of Transportation.
domain case prevailed and was awarded attorneys' fees. 4 The Department
court.55
of Transportation deposited the money into the registry of the
Unsatisfied with the terms of his win, plaintiff filed a motion for a
57
Because a statute
rehearing. 56 When that failed, plaintiff appealed.
provided any withdrawal of the funds would result in the appeal being
dismissed, 58 plaintiff left the money in the court registry for the three years it
took to complete the appeal process. 59 Ultimately, the appeal was
unsuccessful. Then, plaintiff withdrew the money from the court registry
and moved for an award of interest for the three-year period from entry of
judgment to the withdrawal.6 Reversing the trial court, the district court
concluded he was entitled to it. The Florida Constitution mandates full
63
compensation for land taken. That mandate would be violated if a plaintiff
is denied interest on land held in the court's registry pending appeal, even if
that appeal is unsuccessful. 64
Sayre v. JMC Painting, Inc.65 Plaintiff filed her action against the
landowner and the general contractor in county court. 6 The action was
67
based on the claim that a contract had been breached. Among the counts
were claims for a mechanic's lien and the transfer bond surety.68 There were
also claims against the payment bond. 9 However, the county court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a surety bond,70 so these
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1018-19.
778 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.at 1064.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hardeb,778 So. 2d at 1064 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.131(1) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
Hartleb v. Dep't of Transp., 778 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
778 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at431.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sayre, 778 So. 2d at 431.
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claims were dismissed. 71 The county court then granted attorney's fees to
the two sureties. 72 Unfortunately, the county court failed to specify its basis
for granting attorney's fees.73 If attorney's fees were granted under the
Mechanic's Lien Act, 74 then the attorney's fees award was improper.
Lacking subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, the court also lacked
jurisdiction to award attorney's fees based on that claim.75 Therefore, the
case was remanded to the trial court to determine the basis of its decision to
grant attorney's fees.1
Department of Transportationv. Patel. The Department brought a
condemnation action to take part of the landowner's land. 78 At the close of
the evidence, the Department moved for a whole taking of the land, rather
than a partial taking, if that turned out to be less expensive, as was then
allowed by section 337.27(2) of the Florida Statutes.79 The landowner
opposed the motion. 8° The court denied the motion, but ordered an interrogatory verdict be distributed to the jury." The court82made a compensation
award and then proceeded to consider attorney's fees.
One component of the attorney's fees awarded was for nonmonetary
benefits achieved for the landowner, 3 including the value of the land that the
Department failed to take when the motion for a whole taking was
defeated.84 In addition, the nonmonetary benefits included the income from
that land.85 However, the district court rejected this characterization. 8 6
Rather, attorney's fees for defeating that motion should be calculated as if a
condemnation had been defeated under the other part of the statute.87 That
constituted reversible error.88 However, the Department conceded that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1999).
Sayre, 778 So. 2d at 431.
Id. at 432.
768 So. 2d 1173 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Patel,768 So. 2d at 1174.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(b) (1997).

83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Patel,768 So. 2d at 1174.

Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id. (citing FLA.
Id.

STAT.

§ 73.092(2)).
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where the attorney's efforts had extended the period that the landowner
remained in possession of the premises, there was a benefit achieved for
which attorney's fees could be recovered. 89 The trial court also committed
reversible error by awarding expert witness fees when the testimony's sole
use was as a basis for claiming attorney's fees. 90 Since the condemnee has
no interest in the attorney's fees obtained, there is no right to recover
attorney's fees and litigation costs.91
V. BROKERS
FramerRealty, Inc. v. Ross.92 Out-of-state buyers were looking for an
expensive house.
Framer showed them numerous properties when they
visited Florida. 94 They expressed particular interest in a certain house which
they had seen twice, but indicated they first had to complete an out-of-state
transaction. 95 Eventually they did return to Florida to complete the purchase,
but they used another broker, Ross, to make the offer and handle the
96
97
closing.
Ross collected and kept the entire commission.
As a result,
Framer sued Ross, who was aware that Framer had shown the house to the
buyers, for unjust enrichment. 98 The trial court granted Ross's motion for
summary judgment. 99
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.'0 To recover, Framer
would have to show that he had an implied contract or that he was the
procuring cause of the sale. 0 1 "Genuine issues of material fact remain for a
determination by ,,102
the trier of fact as to whether Framer was a procuring cause
of the sale ....
Framer might have been entitled to a broker's
commission because he brought the buyers to see the property. 0 3 The
89.

Patel, 768 So. 2d at 1175.

90.
91.

Id.
Id.

92.

768 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.

97.

Ross, 768 So. 2d at 6.

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Ross, 768 So. 2d at 6.
Id.
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evidence might lead to the conclusion that he was intentionally excluded by
the buyer and seller from the negotiations that led to the sale. 104 Also, "it
could be reasonably inferred that Ross accepted the benefit of Framer's
efforts" to sell the house. 0 5 Consequently, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 0 6
Media Services Group, Inc. v. Bay Cities Communications,Inc.' °7 The8
station. 1
plaintiff had a ninety-day exclusive right to sell defendant's radio
Defendant terminated the agreement when the ninety days ran out.'0 9 However, plaintiff continued to try to find a buyer for the station.11 It was on a
list of stations that were available that plaintiff sent to Root Communications."' Plaintiff also arranged for personnel from Root to tour the
station and meet with a major shareholder of defendant." 2 Plaintiff also
sent to Root." 3 Defendant knew about
included the station in a offering
4
these efforts and cooperated."1
Plaintiff directed its sales appeals to other prospective buyers. 5 Those
efforts produced Hochman Communications which signed a "letter
agreement '" 16 with defendant.'1 7 Hochman had difficulty getting the
necessary financing, but plaintiff did not give up." 8 It worked to make the
deal happen. 1 9 Before that could occur, defendant started negotiating with
another buyer.'20 Plaintiff finally discovered that buyer was Root; so it
notified defendant that it had produced Root and wanted to be involved in
the negotiations. 121 Plaintiff was not allowed to participate. 122 The station

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Ross, 768 So. 2d at 7.
237 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.

Id.
Id. at 1328 n.1.
Id.
at 1328.
Id.
Media Servs. Group Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.
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was sold to Root, and defendant refused to pay plaintiff a commission for the

sale. 123
Plaintiff sued in federal district court. 124
Its complaint for
compensation had three counts: breach of an oral contract, unjust
enrichment, and quantum meruit.1'2 The oral contract and quantum meruit
claims were tried by a jury which returned a verdict for defendant. 12 The
unjust enrichment claim, being equitable in nature, was tried by the court
without a jury. 127 The district judge held defendant liable based on unjust
enrichment. 128 Defendant appealed.129
Defendant claimed that under Florida law, a broker could not recover
for unjust enrichment.' 30 That argument was rejected. 13 1 Florida case law
showed that a broker could recover for unjust enrichment based on "either
the existence of an implied contract to pay him for [his] services in finding
and negotiating with the ultimate purchasers or that he was the procuring
factor in the sale."'132 The problem for plaintiff was that it had not negotiated
with the ultimate purchasers and the district court had expressly stated in its
final order that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of this sale. 33 The
court of appeal noted that in order to be considered the procuring cause of
the sale, "the broker must have brought the [parties] together and effected
the sale as a result of continuous negotiations inaugurated by him unless the
seller and buyer intentionally exclude the broker and thereby vitiate the need
for continuous negotiations."' 3" The facts in the record demonstrated that
this broker brought the parties together. 13 The facts in the record also
demonstrated that the buyer and seller intentionally excluded the broker
from the negotiations. 36 There was no need to show that the buyer and
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Plaintiff did not appeal. Id. at 1328-29 n.4.
127. Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328 n.4.
128. Id. at 1328.
129. Id. at 1327.
130. Id. at 1329.
131. Id.
132. Media Servs. Group,Inc., 237 F.3d at 1329 (citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Sheldon Greene & Assoc., Inc. v. Rosinda Inv., N.V., 475 So. 2d
925, 927 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); rev. dismissed, Horn v. Sheldon Greene & Assoc.,
Inc., 502 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1987)).
135. Id. at 1330.
136. Id.
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seller had acted in bad faith. 37 The record also showed that the property had
been sold. 138 Consequently, the district court must have meant that plaintiff
was not the procuring cause in this case only because the buyer and seller
had prevented it from bringing the sale to closure. 139 Thus, the court's
finding of facts was consistent with defendant's being held liable.' 40 Since
that was the only possible explanation, a remand for further proceedings was
unnecessary. 141 The court of appeal could not disturb the findings of the
federal district court because they were not clearly erroneous. 142
Newbern v. Mansbach.143 Buyers sued the real estate broker and the
insurance agent for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 144 Buyer
alleged that they would not have purchased the land if they had known that it
was located in a Coastal Barrier Resource Area (CBRA) or that they could
not get federal flood insurance. 145 The broker conceded that she represented
that the land was not located in the CBRA even though she had information
that it was.146 Because it was located in the CBRA, federal flood insurance
could not be obtained.' 47 The insurance agent knew this before the real
estate closing, but failed to reveal it, despite having represented to the buyers
that the insurance had been obtained. 148
The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants.' 49 Its
theory was that whether the land was located in the CBRA was a matter that
150
could be determined from the public records by reasonable efforts.
Consequently, recovery for misrepresentation was precluded as52a matter of
law.' 5 ' The First District Court of Appeal rejected that analysis.1

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1330.
777 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id.
Id.

148. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1045.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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The elements for recovery based on negligent misrepresentation are
borrowed from section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'53 It
provides that a person may be held liable for a negligent misrepresentation if
in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss ... if he fails
to exercise reasonable care 1or
54 competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
However, he wili only be liable for harm that resulted from justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation. 155 "[Jiustifiable reliance is an issue of
comparative negligence that should be resolved by a jury.' 56 Therefore, the
trial court should have allowed the jury to determine if the buyers justifiably
relied upon the misrepresentations or had been negligent in not discovering
these facts from the public records.
The claim of fraudulent misrepresentation raised a slightly different
issue. The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may rely on it, "even
though its falsity could have been ascertained had he made an investigation,
unless he knows the representation to be false or its falsity is obvious to
him., 15 7 That presents questions of disputed fact that could not be properly
disposed of by summaryjudgment based on the information being available
in the public records. 8 The CBRA regulations and documents are
complicated and so the falsity of the misrepresentations was not obvious. 59
Scott v. Simpson.'60 A real estate salesman signed a contract to sell
units at a condominium project.' 6 ' The contract provided that he would
receive a 1.5% commission on each sale but it was to be payable half when
the statutory162right to rescission expired and the other half when the sale was
completed.
The contract also provided that the salesman would forfeit any
153. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1045.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 552(1).
155. Id. § 552(2).
156. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1046 (citing Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 1997)).
157. Id. (quoting from Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980)).
158. Id. at 1047.
159. Id. at 1046.
160. 774 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
161. Id. at 882.
162. Id.
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pending commissions if the contract was terminated.1 63 Eighteen units were
under contract when the salesman received notice alleging certain
shortcomings in his performance, and therefore, termination of the
contract. 64
The salesman sued for the unpaid commissions on the eighteen units
and won in the trial court, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed.
"Interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law,' ' 166 so the
appellate court engaged in a de novo review. 167 It found that the contract
clearly and unambiguously provided that unpaid commissions would be
forfeited upon termination of the contract.161 "Agreements entitling sales
persons to commissions only after the sales have actually closed are standard
16 9
in this business, and have been upheld by this and other courts.'
Consequently, the salesman was not entitled to these commissions under the
contract.
Moreover, since the parties had a valid express contract
covering these sales, the salesman could not recover on the theory of
quantum meruit.171
It is worth noting that there is no mention of any claim that the
termination was unjustified or in any way wrongful. Nor was there any
mention of a claim that disparate bargaining power was exerted to get the
salesman to agree to these terms. If such factors had appeared, they might
have changed the outcome of the case.
Southampton Development Corp. v. Palmer Realty Group, Inc. 72 The
broker negotiated a fee arrangement with the seller that provided "if my
[b]uyer goes to contract with you, the following commission schedule will
apply .... ,,173 The buyer and seller had not signed a contract when seller
filed for bankruptcy reorganization. 174 Later, with the approval of the
bankruptcy court, seller did reach an agreement with buyer. 7 After the
closing, the broker filed a claim for a commission with the bankruptcy
163. Id. at 882.

164. Id.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Scott, 774 So. 2d at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scott, 774 So. 2d at 884.
Id.
769 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id. at 1115.
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court. 176 That claim was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the broker to
file suit in state court. 177 The broker first had to prove it did not have
adequate notice of the bankruptcy to succeed in state court. 17 The broker
was able
to surmount that hurdle, but winning on the merits was a different
9
17

story.

The district court concluded that the broker never had a contract with
the seller. 10 Careful scrutiny revealed that the fee arrangement between the
broker and seller was merely an offer to enter into a unilateral brokerage
contract.181 The offer would be accepted by performance, i.e., the buyer and
seller signing a sales contract. 18
That had not occurred before the
bankruptcy was filed. 18 Afterwards, the seller was operating as a debtor in
possession.1
The debtor in possession was considered a different person
from the debtor, i.e., the seller, who had made the offer of the unilateral
brokerage contract. 1 5 Consequently, neither the debtor in possession
signing the sales contract nor closing on the contract could be considered an
acceptance of that offer to enter into the contract to pay a commission.186 It
is worth noting that there is no mention of a claim for quantum meruit. Such
a claim might have succeeded, but it would also present interesting
theoretical problems.
VI. CONDOMINIUMS

Cooley v. PheasantRun at Rosemont Condominium Ass'n. 187 The issue
here was whether a condominium unit owner could be joined as a party to a
suit against the condominium association for an injury that occurred on the
common elements of the condominium. 188 Appellant brought an action
against appellees for an injury sustained while on the appellees property in

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Southampton Dev. Corp., 769 So. 2d at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Southampton Dev. Corp., 769 So. 2d at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
781 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1183.
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which he joined individual unit owners as defendants in the suit.189
Appellant alleged that he was injured while an invited guest upon the
common elements of the condominium grounds. 19° The circuit court
dismissed the individual unit owners from the suit, holding that Florida law
did not support such an action against unit owners, 92
but could only be
19
maintained against the association. 1 Plaintiff appealed.1
The appellate court held that under section 718.119(2) of the Florida
Statutes, the only liability of individual unit owners was for those additional
assessments by the condominium association in relation to the use of the
3 Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly
common
dismissedelements.1
the individual
unit owners from plaintiffs personal injury suit. 9 4
VII. CONSTRUCTION
Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Airport Authority v. R. Hyden
Construction, Inc.195 The construction contract had a change order provision. 196 In the event there were alterations in the work, those alterations, and
an adjustment in the price, were to be agreed upon by the parties. 9 7 The
parties executed one such change order which included a price increase.' 98
Subsequently, the contractor submitted another change order for another
99
price increase based upon costs associated with the earlier change order.
The Airport Authority rejected the second change order and refused to pay
the higher price. 2m The contractor sued for the higher price on the theory of
breach of contract.2°! The Airport Authority's motion for summary judgment was denied and the jury found in favor of the contractor. 2 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed. 2D3
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cooley, 781 So. 2d at 1183.
193. Id. at 1184.
194. Id. at 1184-85.
195. 766 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
196. Id. at 1238-39.
197. Id. at 1239.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. R. Hyden Constr., Inc., 766 So. 2d at 1239.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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The change order, once executed by both parties, became part of the
contract. 2 04 Here, the executed change order clearly established the total
sum due for the work. 2 5 "[S]ince there was no ambiguity, the interpretation
' 26
of the parties' agreement is a question of law to be resolved by the court. 0
Consequently, it was reversible error to submit to the jury the question of
whether the contractor was entitled to recover the additional costs generated
by the change order.2 7 To the contrary,
summary judgment should have
2 08
been entered for the Airport Authority.
Gables v. Choate.2° 9 Prior to the completion of a luxury condominium
residence, the buyer contracted to purchase it for $700,000.210 One clause
provided that the buyer would forfeit his substantial deposit if he failed to
close.211 The contract also contained a date when construction had to be
completed and a liquidated damages provision giving the buyer a credit of
$5000 for each month of delay.212 Six months after the due date, the
construction was still not finished and the developer was in severe financial
trouble. 213 The parties entered into an improvement contract that gave the
developer thirty days to finish the construction. 4 Any delay would result in
the developer having to pay the buyer $5000 per week. 215 The buyer finally
moved into the unit over Ityear later, but the unit was far from finished and
what had been completed was done badly. 216 It still had not been finished
when the developer walked off the job six months later.217 The buyer hired
another contractor who put the apartment into proper order for about
$8000. 218 Buyer sued the developer and, based on the liquidated damages
clause, was awarded over $125,000.219

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
R. Hyden Constr., Inc., 766 So. 2d at 1239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
792 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gables, 792 So. 2d at 521.
Id.
Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Gables, 792 So. 2d at 522.
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The developer's point on appeal was that the liquidated damages clause
was invalid because it was really a penalty. 2 The district court rejected the
argument.2 '1 The parties were sophisticated and represented by counsel. 222
Buyer had bargained for a luxury residence and ended up having to live in223a
construction zone while struggling to complete the construction properly.
Buyer had suffered "prolonged inconvenience, discomfort, invasion of
privacy and renegotiation . ,,22 Calculating damages for that injury
would be difficult and the amount was not necessarily disproportionate to
the figure agreed upon. 22 5 On this final point, Senior Judge Nesbitt
disagreed in a brief dissent.226
The Palms v. Magil ConstructionFlorida,Inc.227 The contractor sued a
landowner claiming breach of a construction contract. 228 The landowner
raised, as a defense, that the contractor did not have a license and was,
therefore, barred from recovering. 229 The contractor had applied for a
license before entering into the contract, but a license had never been
issued.2 30 The contractor asserted the right to cure its missing license
problem by obtaining a license, relying on a sentence in the statute that
stated, "[h]owever, in the event the contractor obtains or reinstates his
license, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply."2 3 1 The problem
facing the court was that the quoted sentence had been subsequently
232
eliminated by the legislature.
So the amendment would only apply to this
case if it had retroactive effect.23 3 The district court concluded that the
amendment "worked a change in the substantive rights of contractors... [s]ince [it] is a substantive change in law, the 2000 amendment does
not operate retroactively." 23 However, the court avoided interpreting the
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 523.
223. Id.
224. Gables,792 So. 2d at 523.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 785 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 597-98.
230. Id. at 597.
231. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1995)).
232. See Ch. 2000-372, § 35, 2000 Fa. Laws 4307, 4338 (codified at
§ 489.128 (2000)).
233. Palms, 785 So. 2d at 598.
234. Id.

FLA. STAT.
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effect of the 2000 amendment. 235 It based its ruling on the assumption that
the amendment would bar the contractor from avoiding the statute's effect
by getting a license.236
Performing Arts CenterAuthority v. Clark Construction Group, Inc. 37
When a puddle was found on the floor of the Performing Arts Center in
February, 1995, the manager suspected a roof leak and contacted the roofing
contractor. 238 An inspection revealed that the leak was in the exterior
Stucco. 239 Minor cracks were discovered and the stucco subcontractor
explained that the cracking was caused by the building settling.2 In June
1995, a consultant advised that the building could not be repainted because
the cracks in the exterior stucco were too extensive.24 After heavy rains,
another consultant concluded that the exterior walls had been improperly
designed and built.2 2 The Performing Arts Center filed suit against the
general contractor and the stucco subcontractor on May 14, 1999, less than
four years from receiving the report identifying the nature of the defect, but
more than four years after the other events.2 A3 The trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of
limitations. 2 "
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was a
question of fact when the plaintiff had notice of the latent defect.24 5 The
court distinguished cases in which there were leaks immediately after a new
roof had been installed because they involved a situation in which it was
"not only apparent, but obvious, that someone is at fault." 246 "However, as
in this case, where the manifestation is not obvious but could be due to
causes other than an actionable defect, notice as a matter of law may not be
inferred." 4 7

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
1983)).
247.

Id.
Id.
789 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Clark Constr. Group, Inc., 789 So. 2d at 394.
Id.
Id. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2001).
Clark Constr. Group, Inc., 789 So. 2d at 394.
Id. (quoting Kelly v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 435 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla.
Id.
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Shapiro v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.SM r.
and Mrs. Shapiro contracted to buy a new home to be built by Centron.249
Title to the land passed from Centron to the Shapiros little more than a
month later.25 0 After a year, the house still had not been completed, and
25 1
eventually, Centron abandoned the project leaving the house incomplete.
Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro won a judgment against Centron, but were unable to
collect, so they filed a claim on the Construction Industries Recovery Fund
52
administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.2
Their claim was denied on the grounds that they were not the owners of the
land when the contract was signed.253 The governing statute provided: "A
person is not qualified to make a claim for recovery from the Construction
Industries Recovery Fund if: ... (c) Such person's claim is based upon a
construction contract inwhich the licensee [builder] was acting with respect
to the property owned or controlled by the licensee .... ,254
The Fifth District Court of Appeal applied the purpose approach of
statutory interpretation. The legislature passed the statute to protect
consumers who are harmed by defaulting contractors.255 To deny a
consumer protection merely because the builder owned the land at the time
of contracting would undermine the protection that the legislature had
provided. 6 Such an interpretation was "unreasonable" and, consequently,
the decision of the Board was reversed. 7
VIII. COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS

Eckerd Corp. v. Comers Group, Inc.258 The issue here is whether a
restriction in a deed prevented the use of a piece of uoperty as a parking lot
for the type of business proscribed by the restriction. 9
In this case appellant bought land to build a pharmacy.7 When it was
unable to purchase enough adjoining property, appellant sold the property
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

788 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Shapiro, 788 So. 2d at 1102.
FLA. STAT. § 489.141(2)(c) (2000).
Shapiro, 788 So. 2d at 1102.
Id.
Id.
786 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 2000).
Id. at 589.
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imposing a restrictive covenant against use of that property as a drugstore. 61
Appellant then purchased land on the opposite comer and built a pharmacy. 262 Appellees purchased the restricted property as well as an adjacent
tract of land and submitted a development plan for a competing pharmacy to
be built, with its parking lot located on that portion of the land which carried
the restrictive covenant entered by appellant.2 63 The appellate court found
that the purpose of the restricted covenant was to prevent the restricted
parcel from being used as any part of a competing pharmacy. 2 4
The appellate court held that the restricted parcel was a necessary part
of the proposed pharmacy.265 Therefore, use of any part of the restricted
266
parcel for parking or ingress or egress violated the restrictive covenant.
IX. DEEDS
American General Home Equity, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc.267 The issue in this case is whether a deed is valid when it only has one
signature of an identified
witness, the signature of the grantor, and the
268
signature of the notary.
The appeals court noted section 689.01 of the FloridaStatutes provides
"that an interest in land be conveyed 'by instrument in writing, signed in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses by the party... conveying... such
...interest. ... ,,269 American argued against summary judgment because
there allegedly were questions of material fact supposedly raised by the deed
having three signatures and the notary having seen the grantor sign the deed
as evidenced by its affidavit in opposition to summary judgment.27° The
appeals court found the affidavit insufficient because it failed to state the
notary signed in the capacity of a witness. 27 ' There is no presumption that

260. Id.

261. Id.

262. Id. at 590.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Eckerd Corp., 786 So. 2d at 590.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
769 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509-10.
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when a notary acknowledges an instrument the notary is signing also as a
witness.272 The lower court was affirmed.273
Mattox v. Mattox.274 The issue here is whether decedent delivered a
properly executed and recorded deed to the husband. 275
In this case the decedent divided a three-acre parcel of land into three
one-acre lots by executing a deed to each lot, and by naming as grantee each
of her three sons. 276 She kept a life estate to herself in each deed and
recorded them in 1979. 277 In 1996, when decedent's -health began to fail, she
prepared a deed reconveying appellant husband's lot, appellee's lot, and onehalf of the third son's lot to appellee. 278 The deed was executed by decedent
in the hospital and was recorded by appellee. 279 After decedent's death,
appellants sued appellee to quiet title, for slander of title, and for unjust
enrichment. 280 The trial court failed to determine whether the title to
appellant husband's lot had vested and appellants filed an appeal. 28 1
The court held that the recording of the 1979 deed to appellant husband
in the absence of fraud vested ,the remainder interest in appellant282husband, so
that, upon decedent's death, he was vested with fee simple title. Therefore,
the judgment
was vacated except as to its denial of appellee's unlawful entry
3
claim.2
Zurstrassen v. Stonier.28 The issue is whether the trial court erred in
entering summary judgment for defendants in plaintiff Zurstrassen's quiet
title action where factual issues existed as to whether Zurstrassen should be
estopped from asserting that deed was a forgery, whether he waived his right
to contest the forged deed, and whether he ratified the forged deed. 28 5
In June 1997, Klaus Zurstrassen, a citizen of Germany, and his brother
Rolf, a United States citizen, purchased two lots in Indian River County with
272. Am. Gen. Home Equity, Inc., 769 So. 2d at 509 (citing Walker v. City of
Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.App. 1978)).
273. Id. at 510.

274. 777 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
275. Id. at 1043.

276. Id. at 1042.

277. Id.
278. Id.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Mattox, 777 So. 2d at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
786 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

285. Id. at 67.
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the intent to build on the lots and then sell them.2 6 On September 10, 1997,
Klaus returned to Germany leaving Rolf in charge of commencing
construction. 287 A deed was recorded fifteen days later, conveying Klaus'
interest to Rolf.288 Klaus returned in October, unaware of the deed, and
contacted a realtor to list the property in February 1998.289 When the listing
agent's preliminary title search indicated that Klaus' name did not appear on
the last deed of record, his brother Rolf led him to believe it was just a mix
up and that he shouldn't worry about title problems. 29 0 The two brothers
entered into a written agreement that stated title was in Rol' s name alone
and then outlined the process by which the proceeds of sale would be
distributed after closing.291 Because his visa was expiring, Klaus had to
return to Germany shortly thereafter.292
In June of 1998, Rolf transferred title to both lots to David Stonier by
quit claim deed.293 Two months later, Stonier transferred title to the
Wihlborgs by warranty deed. 294 The deed was inadvertently recorded in the
wrong county and not correctly recorded in Indian River County until
November 23, 1998.295 Klaus had received notice while in Germany that the
lots had been sold, and as soon as he returned to the United States, he
investigated the title and filed a suit to quiet title to the property and for
rescission.29 6 The lis pendens was recorded on November 10, 1998, thirteen
days before the Wihlborg deed.297
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 298
The court concluded that Klaus either waived or was estopped from
asserting his rights to object to the forged deed when he entered into the
February 1998 agreement with his brother, on the basis that he was aware of
299
the forged deed in 1998 and failed to take action.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 67.

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 68.
299. Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 68.
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The appellate court held that because the deed from Klaus to Rolf was
void, it had no legal effect to transfer Klaus' ownership of the property to
Rolf.3° "[A] forged deed is void and thus creates no legal title nor affords
protection to those claiming under it."30 1 If fraud in the inducement 30is2
present, then the deed may still convey title but be voidable in equity.
When applied to titles of land, a party who allows another to purchase title to
the property under an erroneous opinion of title and who by acts, words or
silence, does not disclose his claim, cannot come back later and exercise his
legal right against the purchaser. 30 3 In this case, because Klaus made no
representations to either Stonier or the Wihlborgs, and the record contained
no evidence indicating he knew of the forged deed at the time he entered into
the February 1998 agreement with his brother, the trial court erred 3in°4
concluding he had knowledge of the forgery and failed to take action on it.
Appellees' argument for equitable estoppel fails because they cannot show
Klaus misrepresented a material fact (clear title) that they relied on to their
detriment. 3°
The appellate court also found issues of fact as to whether Klaus
waived his right to contest the forged deed. 306 In order to waive a right, a
party has to have: "(1) ...a right, privilege, advantage or benefit which may
be waived; (2) the actual or constructive knowledge of [that] right; and (3)
the intention to relinquish the right., 30 7 "Waiver of fraud can occur308where a
party should have discovered the fraud through ordinary diligence.,
Waiver can also be implied; forebearance for a reasonable time alone is
not enough, but conduct that leads a party to believe a right has been waived
may imply such a waiver. 309 In this case, the appellate court found questions

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 68.
Id. See McCoy v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1979).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 68.
Id. at 69; see also Coram v. Palmer, 58 So. 721, 722 (Fla. 1912).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 70.
Id. at 71.

306. Id. at 70.
307. Id. See also Leonardo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 675 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
308. Zurstrassen, 786 So. 2d at 70; see Humer v. Mut. Bankers Corp., 191 So. 831,
833 (Fla. 1939).
309. Zurstrassen, 786 So. 2d at 70; see Am. Somax Ventures v. Touma, 547 So. 2d
1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Arbogast v. Bryan, 393 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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of fact existing as to whether Klaus used due diligence in discovery of the
forgery.3 1°
The appellate court also found that the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment on the issue of ratification of the fraud. 31 1 Ratification of
fraud is an issue of fact. 312 If Klaus knew of the fraud, did not reject it, and
took a material act inconsistent with an intent to avoid it, or delayed in
asserting any remedial rights, then he would have ratified the fraud.3 13 Here,
there was no evidence indicating he had knowledge of the fraud. 314 The
document acknowledging title in Rolf's name alone and authorizing Rolf to
sell the property was based on his good faith belief that the title problems
35
were merely a mix up, not the true state of ownership of the property. 1
X. EASEMENTS
316

Perkins v. Smith.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in its
finding that a recorded easement agreement between Perkins' predecessor in
title and Smith precludes317Perkins from obtaining a statutory way of necessity
across Smith's property.
Perkins purchased a landlocked parcel of land for residential and
318
agricultural purposes.
His land is bordered by property owned by Smith, a
Mr. Clemmons, the South Florida Water Management District, and the
Kissimmee River.319 He accessed his property by using an existing private
road over Smith's land, which had been there for eight years. 32 Perkins
knew before taking title that his seller had entered into an easement
agreement with Smith regarding the use of the road. 321 The recorded
agreement required extensive improvements to the road, at the expense of
the grantee for permanent use of the road. 322 Smith offered Perkins the same

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. See Ball v. Ball, 36 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1948).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 71.
Id.
794 So. 2d 647 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.
Id.
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contractual use of the easement afforded his seller.121 Perkins took the
position that this was a unilateral offer, and he declined. 32 There was
testimony at trial that if he built a new road, Perkins could access his land
from a public road to the north. 325 Although the route would be shorter than
the one presently used, the new road would have to be built over mostly raw
land and bodies of water. 326 The trial court entered a judgment that Perkins
had "an express right to build a paved road onto his property" pursuant to the
recorded easement and Smith's offer.327
The appellate court reversed, holding that Perkins was not barred from
the benefits of section 704.01(2) of the FloridaStatutes.2 A statutory way
of necessity, exclusive of any common-law right exists when a parcel of land
is landlocked so that no practicable route of egress or ingress is available to
the nearest public or private road.329 The land must be outside any
municipality and either used or intended to be used for residential or
agricultural purposes. 330 The owner or tenant thereof may use and maintain
an easement over the lands lying between the landlocked parcel and the
nearest practical route.331
The term "practical" used in section 704.01 of the FloridaStatutes is
defined in section 704.03 of the FloridaStatutes to mean "without the use of
bridge, ferry, turnpike road, embankment, or substantial fill. ' 332 In this case,
in order for Perkins to reach the public road to the north, he would have to
construct a road over mostly raw land and bodies of water, requiring
embankment, and involving substantial fill.333 Based on the foregoing
reasoning, the appellate court concluded that the existing road across
Smith's land constituted the shortest, practical route, and Perkins was
entitled to a statutory way of necessity across Smith's lands, notwithstanding
the terms of the easement.3 34
323. Id.

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.

327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA.
Id.

STAT.

§ 704.01(2) (1999)).

331. Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.
332. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 704.03 (1999)).
333. Id. See Keene v. Jackson, 732 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Trammell v. Ward, 667 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walkup v. Becker, 161 So.
2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
334. Perkins,794 So. 2d at 648.
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XI. EMINENT DOMAIN

Armadillo Partners, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.335 The
Department was engaged in a road improvement project that required taking
part of the landowner's parking lot. 336 The landowner was entitled to
severance damages for the loss in value the taking effected on its remaining
land.337 Ordinarily, severance damages are calculated as the difference
between the value of the land before the taking and after.338 However, an
alternative valuation is the cost of curing the harm the taking caused.339 In
this case, the Department took seventy-three of the 140 parking spaces in the
parking lot.3 4 The Department proposed a plan to cure part of that loss b
locating twenty-six parking spaces elsewhere on the landowner's land.3
Over the landowner's objection, the trial dcurt admitted valuation testimony
that was based upon that plan. 342 The district court found that testimony
inadmissible because it was based
on a misconstruction of the law and,
343
consequently, reversed the case.
The Department's expert used the relocation of twenty-six parking
spaces to reduce the severance damages suffered by the landowner. 3
However, the expert failed to offset the loss the landowner would suffer by
that relocation. 345 In this case, the twenty-six parking spaces were to be
carved out of an "Arbor Area" located in front of some of the businesses.
"In a consistent line of cases, Florida courts have held that where property
outside the parcel taken is converted to parking to effect a cure of severance
damages, the loss of that property must be taken into account in determining
severance damages."34 7 The valuation did not include independent consideration to the landowner's loss
of that area, so the valuation should not have
3
been admitted into evidence. 48
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

780 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 780 So. 2d at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 780 So. 2d at 236.
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Id.
Id.
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The cure was also based upon a proposal to build new driveways at
particular locations. 349 However, the driveways could not be built there
without violating the regulations of the Water Management District.3 5° Thus,
351
the cure was based upon mere speculation that it could be put into effect.
Equally important, the relocation of the driveways did not appear in the
It was an
pleadings or in the construction plans entered into evidence.
error to allow testimony about a plan that was inconsistent with the plans
that were in evidence. 3
Cordones v. Brevard County.3 54 The county condemned an easement to
the beach as part of a beach renourishment project. 35 5 Evidence showed that
without the project, the beach would erode through the dune line.356 In order
to obtain federal funds, the county needed at least a fifty-year easement.3 57
The landowners unsuccessfully asserted that the county had not established
the taking was necessary for the public purpose claimed.358 The district court
rejected this claim. 359 It recognized that "[n]o bright line test is available to
determine what constitutes 'reasonable necessity' for a taking by a condemning authority." 36 However, "[a] trial court's order approving condemnation of private property for public use should not be disturbed on appeal
when the taking is supported by good faith considerations of cost, safety,
environmental protection and long-term planning. ' 36' The county had
followed the directions of the United States Corps of Engineers and
362
Thus, there was
condemned only what was required to do the job.
suggest bad faith
evidence
to
and
no
sufficient evidence of a public purpose
or over reaching by the county. 63

349.
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351.
352.
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360.
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Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
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The landowners also claimed that the county failed to introduce a valid
appraisal into evidence. 36 The county's appraiser had not produced a
written report, but testified that he used his perceptions of the market and
how the taking would reduce the value of the servient lands. 365 The court
recognized that the valuing of easements is problematic and that no Florida
case establishes how they should be valued. 366 Because the property taken
367
was unique, the normal valuation methods would not be appropriate.
368
Consequently, the method used was appropriate.
The trial court, however, made an error in granting a temporary
easement of unlimited duration. 369 All the testimony, including the County's
Resolution of Necessity, concerned the taking of a fifty-year easement.37 °
The order should have set the duration of the easement at fifty years and the
case was remanded for the trial court to modify its order accordingly.37 '
3
The landowner owned a 512-acre tract.
Nutt v. Orange County.
The county took a triangular parcel of 2.545 acres for a road straightening
project that was scheduled for the distant future.374 Exactly how the road
would be straightened had not yet been determined.375 The landowner
sought severance damages because one possible route across the triangle
would have had a serious negative impact on the value of the remaining
land. 376 However, the trial court rejected the claim for severance damages
and the district court affirmed. 37 7 "Everyone is at the mercy of future
37 9
378
However, that risk is not compensable.
governmental planning."
Severance damages can be recovered only for the diminution in value caused
when part of one's land is taken, not because of the potential uses to which

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 522.
Id.
Id. at 524.
769 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nut, 769 So. 2d at 453.
Id.
Id.
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the taken land may eventually be put.38 Consequently, this landowner was
not entitled to severance damages based upon these facts. 381
This
Youth for Christ of Sarasota, Inc. v. Sarasota County.
apparently involved a quick taking pursuant to chapter 74 of the Florida
Statutes, which allows the condemning authority to take the property first
and litigate the taking later.383 As required by the statute, the county made a
"good faith" estimate of the property taken and deposited that amount into
the court's registry. 384 The landowner withdrew the money, so the only issue
remaining for trial was the amount of compensation to which the landowner
was entitled. 385 To the landowner's surprise, the jury decided that the
county's deposit was too generous and that the county was owed a refund of
over fifty-seven thousand dollars.3 86 Accordingly, a final judgment for that
amount was entered in favor of the county. 387 The landowner subsequently
filed a motion to tax costs, and the parties reached an agreement as to the
appropriate figure. 388 Then the county convinced the judge to enter an order
to amend the final judgment, offsetting the costs the county owed the
landowner against the refund the landowner owed the county. 38 When the
landowner's objection was overruled, the landowner appealed. 390
The district court determined that amending the final judgment was a
reversible error. 391 The county had not filed a timely motion to amend the
final judgment as required by rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.392 The time for filing such a motion had run. 393 Thereafter, the
trial court no longer had jurisdiction to amend the final judgment.3 94 On
remand, the trial court was ordered to enter a judgment for costs in favor of
the landowner.395
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
765 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 795.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 74.051, .061 (1993)).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Youth for Christof Sarasota,Inc., 765 So. 2d at 795.

388. Id.

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Youth for Christ ofSarasota,Inc., 765 So. 2d at 795.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at796.
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XII. EQUITABLE LIENS
Liddle v. A.F. Dozer, Inc. 396 The contractor's complaint included
claims for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, and also for the imposition
and foreclosure of an equitable lien.397 Apparently, both claims were based
on the same facts because the trial court found that the contractor was
entitled to a mechanic's lien in the amount of $11,042.08 and an equitable
lien in the amount of $11,042.08.398
A party may seek more than one remedy to redress a particular
wrong.3 "[I]f the remedies are concurrent or cumulative, and logically can
coexist on the same facts, the doctrine of election does not apply until the
injured party has received full satisfaction for his [or her] injuries."''
The
plaintiff here was not required to elect one of the remedies until it was time
for the court to enter the judgment. 40 1 However, the entry of judgment
containing both the mechanic's lien and the equitable lien was reversible
error because it amounted to a double recovery.
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.40 3 Years after their divorce, former spouses
were on such friendly terms that the ex-husband loaned his ex-wife the
money she needed to purchase a condominium apartment.4 He also loaned
her money to make repairs and renovations.40 Their understanding was that
these loans would be repaid when the ex-wife was able to get a conventional
406
mortgage loan.
However, when the opportunity arose to get a conventional mortgage at favorable terms, the ex-wife refused to apply.40 7 That is
when the friendship dissolved into this suit.4

8

The circuit court granted the ex-husband an equitable lien on the unit. 9
The ex-wife appealed, claiming that the ex-husband failed to prove she had
committed fraud or misrepresentation, or that they had an agreement that the
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

777 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.at 422 n.1.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Liddle, 777 So. 2d at 422.
Id.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

408. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 501.

409. Id.

2001]

Brown / Grohman

property would secure the loan.41 The district court rejected those claims,
holding such a showing was not necessary because an equitable lien could be
imposed on property, even homestead property, based upon unjust
enrichment.411 In this case, the ex-wife accepted the benefits of the loan
while knowing that her ex-husband was relying upon her promise to use the
property, once renovated, as security for a mortgage loan and use the
proceeds to repay him.41 2 Allowing her to enjoy the benefits of that
3
agreement while escaping her obligation would unjustly enrich her.4
Conversely, imposing the lien would put her in no worse position that she
would be in had she performed as promised, but it would protect her exhusband from injury.4
XIII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc. v. Community Ass'n Services,
Inc.4 1 5 The developer of a common interest community filed this action
based on the management company's failure to take the steps needed to
collect assessments from the homeowners. 416 The management company
represented to the developer that it took those steps, despite its knowledge to
the contrary. 7 Believing that the assessments were being collected
properly, the developer did not take any action of its own to collect the
assessments or see that they were collected.4 18 The failure to collect the
assessments produced a shortfall for the association. 9 Under the terms of
the declaration, the developer was liable for such shortage. 42° The trial court
dismissed the developer's four-count complaint, but the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed on the counts of fraud and equitable
4
subrogation. 21
The elements of fraud are: "(1) a false statement concerning a material
fact; (2) knowledge by the person making the statement that the
410. Id.
411. Id. at 502.
412. Id.
413. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id.
770 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at717.
Id. at718.
Id.
Id.
Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
Id. at417.
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representation is false; (3) the intent by the person making the statement that
the representation will induce another to act on it; and (4) reliance on the
representation to the injury of the other party. '4 22 The facts alleged included
allegations of fact sufficient to establish all of the elements if proved.42 3
Moreover, when the developer paid the shortfall to the association, it was
paying the debt for assessments owed by individual homeowners to the
association. 424 That sets up a claim for equitable subrogation, i.e., that the
developer would be subrogated to the associations right to collect unpaid
assessments. 4z A person is entitled to subrogation when: "(1) the subrogee
made the payment to protect his or her own interest; (2) the subrogee did not
act as a volunteer; (3) the subrogee was not primarily liable for the debt; (4)
the subrogee paid off the entire debt; and (5) subrogation would not work
any injustice to the rights of a third party.' '426 The developer was secondarily
liable under the terms of the Declaration. So a developer should "be given
the opportunity to show that the equities are in its favor in this action.
Liddle v. A.F. Dozer, Inc.
The contractor's complaint included
claims for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, and also for the imposition
and foreclosure of an equitable lien.429 Apparently both claims were based
on the same facts because the trial court found that the contractor was
entitled to a mechanic's lien in the amount of $11,042.08 and an equitable
lien in the amount of $11,042.08.430
A party may seek more than one remedy to redress a particular wrong.
"[I]f the remedies are concurrent or cumulative, and logically can coexist on
the same facts, the doctrine of election does not apply until the injured party
has received full satisfaction for his [or her] injuries. ' 4" The plaintiff here
was not required to elect one of the remedies until it was time for the court to
enter the judgment. 432 However, the entry of judgment containing both the

422. Id. at 718 (quoting Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984)).
423. Id. at 719.

424. Id.
425. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 719.
426. Id. at 718.
427. Id. at 719.
428. 777 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
429. Id.
430. Id. at422, n.1.
431. Id. at 422 (quoting Goldstein v. Serio, 566 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)).
432. Id.
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lien was reversible error because it
mechanic's lien and the equitable
433
amounted to a double recovery.
Sander v. Ball.434 The option violated the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation because it lacked a time limit.435 The trial court was wrong to
reform the option by adding a time limit so as to avoid the rule violation.
Reformation is available to make the writing agree with what the parties had
actually agreed. It cannot be used to cure a defect in their agreement. Here,
the parties never even discussed a time limit for the o tion.436 The court
could not supply the term under the guise of reformation.
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.43 8 Years after their divorce, former spouses
were on such friendly terms that the ex-husband loaned his ex-wife the
money she needed to purchase a condominium apartment. 439 He also loaned
her money to make repairs and renovations. 440 Their understanding was that
these loans would be repaid when the ex-wife was able to get a conventional
mortgage loan.441 However, when the opportunity arose to get a conventional mortgage at favorable terms, the ex-wife refused to apply.442 That is
when the friendship dissolved into this suit.443
The circuit court granted the ex-husband an equitable lien on the unit.44
The ex-wife appealed, claiming that the ex-husband had failed to prove she
had committed fraud or misrepresentation, or that they had an agreement that
the property would secure the loan. 445 The district court rejected those
claims, holding such a showing was not necessary because an equitable lien
could be imposed on property, even homestead property, based upon unjust
In this case, the ex-wife accepted the benefits of the loan
enrichment.
while knowing that her ex-husband was relying upon her promise to use the
property, once renovated, as security for a mortgage loan and use the
433. Liddle, 777 So. 2d at 422.
434. 781 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). This case is discussed infra in Part
XXI.
435. Id. at 528-29.

436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at 530.
Id. at 530-31.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 501.

440. Id.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 501.

Id.

445. Id.
446. Id. at 502.
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proceeds to repay him." 7 Allowing her to enjoy the benefits of that
agreement while escaping her obligation would unjustly enrich her.8
Conversely, imposing the lien would put her in no worse position than she
would have been in had she performed as promised, but it would protect her
ex-husband from injury." 9

XIV. FORECLOSURES
Dailey v. Leshin.45 This is an appeal of a final summary judgment
against Dailey and Warmus "on their counterclaims raising Truth-in-Lending
Act ("TILA") violations as a defense to a mortgage foreclosure. ' 4Sl The
main issue is whether
property terminates a mortgagor's
• 452
• a contract to sell
The second issue is whether
right to rescind a refinance transaction.
appellants' motion alleging new and different TILA violations was
erroneously dismissed by the trial court as moot and should have been
construed as a motion to amend their counterclaim based upon its
substantive content and not its heading.4 53
Nancy Dailey and Thomas Warmus, appellants, experiencing financial
difficulties, hired attorney Randall Leshin to represent them in various
matters. 54 Leshin put them in touch with Arthur M. Walker as Trustee, who
agreed to hold a mortgage on their homestead property.455 Dailey and
Warmus executed a promissory note and mortgage for $100,000 in April
1998 and a $300,000 future advance and note at the end of May 1998. 456
They were never given the required TILA notice of their right to rescind the
transaction.4 57 When Leshin received the future advance proceeds of
$300,000, he refused to disburse it to Dailey and Warmus, claiming they
owed him attorney's fees for earlier work. 458 Dailey and Warnus

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

Id.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
792 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 529.
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 529.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subsequently failed to make the mortgage payments to Walker because they
believed Leshin and Walker were conspiring together. 45 9
Walker filed an action in 1998 to foreclose the moqtgage, and appellants
filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim.
The counterclaim
did not allege any TILA claims, but in its prayer for relief, sought rescission
and cancellation of the $300,000 note due to fraudulent inducement and
negligent non-disclosures.46 1 During this litigation, Dailey and Warmus
entered into a contract to sell the subject property in March 1999.462 The
pending foreclosure action resulted in a cloud on their title, and the original
closing date of April was extended to May, but there is no indication that the
transaction actually closed.46 3 On May 3, 1999, Dailey and Warmus' motion
to amend their answer and counterclaim to allege TILA violations, RESPA
violations and violations of the Mortgage Brokers Act and Fair Credit
Reporting Act was granted." 4 Walker moved for summary judgment on the
amended counterclaim, claiming that appellant's right of rescission under
TILA had expired because they contracted to sell the property.45 The trial
court granted the summary judgment and determined that all remaining
motions were moot.4 6 Walker subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment on the foreclosure complaint, attaching an affidavit of the amounts
due under both notes at the default interest rate of eighteen percent.4 7
Dailey and Warmus responded with a motion alleging new TILA violations,
which was never heard by the court.
The property was eventually sold in
December 1999.69 Walker was paid, and Dailey and Warmus then appealed
470
the summary judgment entered in Walker's favor on their counterclaim.
The appellate court first addressed the issue of whether Dailey and
Warmus' contract for sale in March 1999 terminated their right of rescission

459. Id.
460. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.

461.
462.
463.
464.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.

465. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.

466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.
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under Section 1635(f) of the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act. 47'
1635(f) provides:

Section

An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the
date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the
property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the
information and forms required under this section or any other
disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the
obligor .... 472
A consumer has the right to rescind up to three business days after the
closing of the transaction or delivery of the TILA disclosures.473 If the
consumer does not receive the disclosures, the right to rescind expires three
years after the closing date or upon the sale of the property, whichever
occurs first. 474 Following the analysis used by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,47 5 the appellate court held that Dailey and Warmus' TIWA claims
based on failure to disclose the right to rescind expired when they entered
into a contract to sell the property.
In this case, when Dailey and Warmus
contracted to sell their property in March, their right to rescind expired
before they exercised it in April. 477 The fact that the sale is pending is
sufficient to trigger the expiration of the right to rescind. 47s The transaction
does not have to close. 479

471. Id. Section 1635(a) provides that where a security interest is retained or acquired
against the principal residence of the obligor in a consumer credit transaction, "the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day
following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and
rescission forms required under this section," whichever is later, by notifying the creditor of
his right to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1997).
472. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1997) (emphasis added).
473. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 530.
474. Id. at D1547-48.
475. See Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1989) (contract for sale of
property terminates the right of recission pursuant to section 1635(f) rather than the actual
sale).
476. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 530. See Hefferman, 882 F.2d at 384. A sale is defined as a
"contract between two parties," in which the seller, "in consideration of the payment of money
or promise of payment .... transfers to the [buyer] the title and possession of the property."
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 531 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979).
477. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 532.
478. Id.
479. Id.
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The appellate court then reviewed the issue of whether the trial court
should have heard Dailey and Warmus' motion filed in response to Walker's
motion for summary judgment.48 0 In reviewing the motion, the appellate
court found that even though it is not titled a "Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim," in substance it seeks to amend. 48 1 The prayer for relief
requested that the court "address the issues of the motion as a new and
separate" TILA violation.4sz Motions to amend should be liberally granted.483 The motion described an arguable additional violation of TILA that
caused appellants additional damages. 484 For this reason, the trial court
improperly concluded it was moot.4 85 So, the appellate
court reversed to
486
permit the lower court to hear and rule on the motion.
Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel.48 7 The issue is whether due process rights
have been violated when the right of redemption granted
in an order has
488
expired prior to the time the order is signed by the court.
The parties had entered into a land sale contract where appellees were
to purchase appellants' motel. 4 9 The consideration for the purchase
consisted of an unsecured promissory note and another promissory note
secured by a mortgage on the property with installment payments over the
course of twenty years. 49 The appellee defaulted on both promissory notes,
and appellants foreclosed on the property with the court granting the
foreclosure.491 Appellees argued mistakes in the trial court's order essentially denied them the right to exercise their right of redemption. 492 The
appellate court noted that the trial court's order providing appellees' right of
redemption was eliminated prior to the execution of the order.493 The court
held a right to redeem foreclosed property was considered to be an estate in
land and was a valued right. 494 As such, the failure of a trial court to provide
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
Id.
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 532.
See Dimick v. Ray, 774 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Dailey,792 So. 2d at 533.
Id.
Id.
770 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283.

490. Id.
491. Id
492. Patel,770 So. 2d at 284.

493. Id.
494. Id.
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that opportunity was not harmless error. 495 Therefore, the court reversed and
remanded the matter to allow appellees the right to exercise their redemption
rights. 496
Indian River Farms v. YBF Partners, InC.497 The issue in this case is
whether the right of redemption was timely and properly exercised.498
Appellee purchased property at a judicial sale, and a certificate of sale was
filed with the clerk on the same day. 499 Appellants objected to the sale, and
the trial court overruled appellants' objections.500 The assignee of appellants
intervened and attempted to exercise their right of redemption by tendering
payment to the clerk of the court, which was refused. 50 1 A certificate of title
was issued to appellee, and appellants moved to compel the clerk to accept
502
assignee's tender for redemption of the property.
The appellate court
found that appellants' objections did not concern any defect or irregularity
with the foreclosure sale itself which is required in order to be a legally
sufficient ground to set aside the sale.50 3
However, the appellate court did find that when assignee tendered
payment under the judgment of foreclosure to the clerk of court, it properly
exercised its right of redemption and did not require the court's
permission. 5°4 The appellate court held that while the clerk of court erred in
failing to accept tender, such error did not render assignee's exercise of its
right of redemption untimely because its tender was made prior to the filing
of the certificate of title. 0 The case was reversed and remanded .5
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. King.50 7 This is a petition for writ of
certiorari seeking review of a non-final order of the Broward County Circuit
Court.50 8 The issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering Norwest
Mortgage, Inc. to issue a satisfaction on its mortgage when it received a
portion of its payoff amount and the funds remaining on deposit in the court
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id.
Id.
777 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Indian River Farms, 777 So. 2d at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
789 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
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accruing on
registry did not allow for additional interest, expenses or costs
"0
the note/mortgage subsequent to the payoff statement date.
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. commenced foreclosure proceedings against
Barbara King in 1997.510 At that time, the outstanding principal and interest
totaled approximately $8000. 5 11 Its motions for summary judgment were
continued repeatedly in order to allow King to quiet title to the property and
then arrange financing to satisfy the mortgage. 512 King received a payoff
statement on December 20, 1999, valid until January 14, 2000.513 The
payoff was for $23,396.47, and included Norwest's payment of taxes and
insurance on the property for the period of time during which the mortgage
was in default.514 King requested a breakdown of the payoff amount along
with copies of invoices and receipts. 51 5 Because she did not receive them
timely, she did not satisfy the mortgage by January 14, 2000.' 16 She did,
however, close on new financing, and funds were withheld to pay off
Norwest.5 17 In March 2000, King filed a motion for expedited final hearing
and to shorten the discovery period and time for production.5 18 She
requested that the court toll the interest and attorney's fees on the open
mortgage from the date of her closing.519 Norwest argued that it did not
produce the requested information timely because, as a result of the delays in
waiting for King to quiet title and arrange financing, some of the records
were hard to obtain.
The trial court granted King relief, and on May 25, 2000, ordered
$23,396.47 (the December 20 payoff statement amount) placed in the court
registry.52 1 Of these funds, $11,228.34 was to be disbursed to petitioner, and
the disputed balance would remain in the court registry pending a
determination of the appropriate expenses. 522 In addition, the order required
Norwest to issue a satisfaction of its mortgage within ten days of its receipt
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

ld. at 1140.
Id.
Id.
King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
Id.
Id.

515. Id.
516. Id.
517. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
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of the $11,228.34. 523 Norwest appealed the order on5 the basis that the
due. 2
amount recovered is insufficient to cover the amount
Under Florida law, a mortgagee is required to issue a satisfaction of
mortgage after full payment of the obligations contained in the note. 5' The
appellate court quashed the order, holding that it could lead to irreparable
harm to Norwest if it were later discovered that Norwest was entitled to
additional interest and expenses. 526 The issuance of a satisfaction of
mortgage terminates the right to foreclose on the property to collect for any
additional funds owed. 527 In this case, because the payoff amount was in
dispute, absent an evidentiary hearing, the trial court was unable to
determine that Norwest was not entitled to receive additional funds in excess
528
The amount deposited did not include
of the payoff figure quoted.
additional interest, advances, or funds for attorney's fees and costs that
continued to accrue subsequent to January 14, 2000 through the date of an
evidentiary hearing. 529 The appellate court concluded that the trial court
forced Norwest to settle its foreclosure action on King's terms, with or
without an evidentiary hearing, which constitutes a departure from the
essential requirements of law.
531
en banc. 532
Secretary of Veteran Affairs v. Tejedo. This is a rehearing
The issue in this case is whether the court will grant leave to amend a
complaint when the original case was heard over a year ago and the party
who instigated the original lawsuit seeking redemption sold the propeity in
question.
In this case, the appellant instigated a suit to force redemption against
the appellee, an omitted lienor in a foreclosure action.534 During the course

523. Id.
524. Id.
525. RA. STAT. § 701.04(1) (2000).
526. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
527. See generally Atkins v. Rybovich Boat Works, Inc., 561 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), quashed on other grounds, 585 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991); State-Wide Constr.
Inc., v. Dowda, 424 So. 2d 198, 198-99 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hallmark Mfg. Inc. v.
Lujack Constr. Co, 372 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
528. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. 774 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
532. Id. at 712.
533. Id.
534. Id.
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of the trial, the appellant transferred the property without notifying the court
or appellee.535
The appeals court held that this "amounts to mala fides and cannot be
condoned."
Also, "[p]arties must come to courts of equity with clean
hands as equity does not condone concealment of affirmative niisconduct. ' 537 The Appellate Court remanded the case with instructions allowing
for leave to amend the pleadings to seek damages for the difference between
the property's fair market value and the amount tendered by appellee, plus
costs and fees.538
South Palm Beach Investments, Inc. v. Regatta Trading Ltd.539 The
issue raised here is whether an emergency motion to intervene, filed by a
prior titleholder, was properly denied by the trial court. 540
South Palm Beach Investments sold its property, and the new owner
obtained a mortgage at closing.541 When the mortgage was foreclosed, South
Palm Beach Investments filed a motion to intervene, which was dismissed. 542
The appellate court affirmed the order.54 3 Once a party has conveyed
all of its rights, title, and interest in a parcel of land to another, that party
will not be a proper party to a suit foreclosing the mortgage. 5" Here,
Regatta Trading was seeking only
to foreclose its mortgage. 45 It was not
seeking a deficiency judgment.546
XV. HOMESTEAD

Dyer v. Beverly & Tittle, P.A. 547 The issue here is whether the marital
property or homestead can be subject to forced sale when the home is
awarded as a form of child support under the divorce proceeding.
535. Id. at 713.
536. Tejedo, 774 So. 2d at 713.
537. Id. (citing Dep't of Revenue v. David, 684 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Id.
789 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.

543. Id.
544. Regatta Trading Ltd, 789 So. 2d at 397.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 397.
547. 777 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
548. Id. at 1056.
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In this case, the couple divorced and the house was awarded to the wife
as a form of child support.549 The court also awarded the wife her attorney's
fees.55 0 The wife then assigned her orders of final judgment for attorney's
fees to her attorneys so that they may pursue their fees.5 51 The attorney's
placed a judgment lien against the home5 52
that the wife lived in which was
owned in the name of the former husband.
The appellate court found that the homestead exemption statute is to
protect not only the husband, but also his family from destitution and
becoming public charge.55 3 The courts have declined to act in equity to
permit the forced sale of a homestead property,
unless there is evidence of
55 4
the debtor's fraudulent or egregious conduct.
The appellate court held that the evidence presented in this case did not
support the application of equitable exception to the homestead exemption
and, therefore, reversed. 55
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill.556 This is a certified question of law
to the Supreme Court of Florida, from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, that is determinative of a case pending in the federal
courts for which there appears to be no controlling precedent. "Does Article
X, Section 4557 of the Florida Constitution exempt a Florida homestead,
where the debtor acquired the homestead using non-exempt funds with the
specific intent of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 726.105 or §§ 222.29 and 222.30?558
In 1981, Havoco sued Hill, claiming damages for fraud, conspiracy,
tortious interference with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary
duty.559 When the case finally went to trial, nine years later, a jury found for
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1057.
551. Id.
552. Dyer, 777 So. 2d at 1057.
553. Id. at 1059 (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1950)).
554. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 761 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
555. Id. at 1059-60.
556. 790 So. 2d 1018 (2001).
557. Art. X, Section 4(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides in part:
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon; obligations contracted for the purchase,
improvement or repair thereof; or obligations contracted for house, field, or other
labor performed on the realty ....
Id.
558. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.
559. Id.
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Havoco and awarded it $15,000,000 in damages. 56 The district court
entered judgment in accordance with the verdict on December 19, 1990; the
judgment became enforceable on January 2, 1991. 561 Hill purchased the
Destin property on December 30, 1990, for which he paid $650,000 in cash
and spent approximately $75,000 for household furnishings. 62 Hill clainis
of Tennessee, he intended to make
that although he was a long time resident
5 63
the Destin property his retirement home.
In July, 1992, Hill filed a voluntary Chapter Seven bankruptcy petition,
in which he claimed that real property located in Destin, Florida was exempt
as his homestead under Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution.56
Havoco objected, arguing that Hill converted nonexempt assets into the
homestead with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. 65 The
bankruptcy court denied Havoco's objections to Hill's homestead claims,
concluding that Havoco had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that Hill acted with the specific intent to defraud his creditors. 6 6
Havoco appealed, and the district court reversed, finding error in the
bankruptcy court's conclusion that a debtor's specific intent to defraud his
creditors could provide a ground to deny the homestead exemption. 67 The
mandate ordered the bankruptcy court "to determine whether and under what
circumstances Florida law prevented debtors.., from converting nonexempt
property to exempt property. '568 On remand, the bankruptcy court held that
under Florida law, Hill was not prohibited from converting nonexempt assets
into a homestead, even if he had the intent to put those assets outside the
reach of his creditors.5 69 They further held that a debtor's right to the
homestead exemption is not affected by Florida's fraudulent conveyance
statute. 70 The district court affirmed the decision and Havoco appealed.57 '
The Eleventh Circuit certified the instant question to the Supreme Court of
Florida, detailing the inconsistent treatment of the issue in the bankruptcy
560. Id.
561. Id.

562. Id.
563. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.

564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 1020.
567. Id.
568. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1020 (citing Havoco of Arm., Ltd. v. Hill, 197 F.3d 1135, 1138
(11th Cir. 1999)).

569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
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courts based on prior applications of the homestead exemption by the
Supreme Court. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
"The transfer of nonexempt assets into an exempt homestead
affirmative.
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not one of the "three
4. 574
exceptions to the homestead exemption provided in article X, section
The court applied a liberal construction to the exemption in the interest
of protecting the family home, but a strict construction of the exceptions
contained therein.575 In applying strict construction to the exceptions, the
Court has refused to allow civil forfeitures of property following convictions
under the RICO Act or findings of fact that debtors converted nonexempt
assets into exempt homestead property with the intent to defraud their
creditors.5 76
The disparate treatment of the exception appears in cases where the
Supreme Court of Florida, in certain instances has allowed the imposition of
equitable liens against homestead property under the "doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 57 7 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected Havoco's argument
that its equitable lien jurisprudence created a fourth exception in cases where
fraud or conversion of nonexempt assets into a homestead for purposes of
578
avoiding creditors.
the
Moss v. Estate of Moss.57 9 In this case, the issue is 5whether
80
descendants.
spouse's
deceased
the
to
inures
homestead property
The decedent died testate leaving no surviving spouse or minor
children. 581 The personal representative of the estate, who is also a beneficiary under decedent's will, filed a petition to determine homestead status of
572. Id.
573. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.
574. Id. at 1028.
575. Id. at 1021.
576. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1992) ("[A]rticle X, section
4 expressly provides for three exceptions to the homestead exemption. Forefeiture is not one
of them."); Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lang, 898 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D. Fla. 1995),
("[H]omestead exemption does not contain an exception for real property which is acquired in
the state of Florida for the sole purpose of defeating the claims of out-of-state creditors.").
577. Legal Subrogation, a/k/a equitable subrogation. Subrogation that arises by
operation of law or by implication in equity to prevent fraud or injustice. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

1440 (7th ed. 1999).

578. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.

2000).
579. 777 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
580. Id. at 1111.
581. Id.
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real property.
The petition requested an order to determine 1) that the
decedent's condo was homestead property; 2) that the condo descended to
the beneficiaries named in the will; and 3) that the constitutional exemption
of a decedent's homestead from creditors' claims against the decedent's
estate inured to the beneficiaries. 83
A creditor of the estate filed an objection to the petition, claiming the
petitioner failed to establish that the devisees of the real estate were qualified
heirs of the decedent. 584 The trial court found that the constitutional
exemption from claims of the decedent's creditors inured to three intestate
heirs, but the exemption did not inure to the heirs of the predeceased spouse
of the decedent. 85
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the
brother of the decedent's last deceased spouse and the niece of the decedent's last deceased spouse as devisees of the decedent's homestead. 8
Reinish v. Clark.58 7 The appellants raise three separate issues as to why
they and the class like them should receive homestead exemption on their
Florida house. 8
The first count alleged that denying the homestead tax exemption to the
Reinishes and their class solely on the basis of their out-of-state residency
was a constitutional and statutory discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.589 The appellate
court held that:
Whether the person is a Florida resident or not, only one
homestead exemption is allowed, irrespective of how many other
residences the person owns. Thus, the exemption distinguishes
between real estate used in good faith as a Florida permanent
residence, on the one hand, and (by implicit exclusion) any other
real estate such59 as secondary or vacation residences or rentals, on
the other hand. D

582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

Id.
Id.
Moss, 777 So. 2d at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113.
765 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 205.
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The appellate court found that the statute did not treat Florida residents who
had more than one home in Florida any differently than those from out of
town.59'
The second count alleged that the Florida constitutional and statutory
homestead tax exemption provisions unconstitutionally infringe upon the
fundamental rights to travel interstate and to own property, in violation of
592
The appellate court held that the
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
exemption is closely and substantially related to the State's valid objective to
promote and protect taxpayers' financial ability to purchase and maintain the
primary shelter, which is totally unrelated to state residency.593 The
appellate court found that because the Reinishes had not demonstrated the
denial of a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
count was properly dismissed.
The third count alleged that the constitutional and statutory homestead
tax exemption provisions constitute a per se violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in that they "attempt to create customs duties, barriers, or
taxes that discriminate against and unduly burden interstate commerce and
impermissibly impose a tariff on citizens whose primary residence is located
outside Florida." 5 The appellate court found no facial discrimination
against interstate commerce nor any burden on interstate commerce that
outweighs its potential benefits. 5
The appellate court concluded, "the
Florida exemption is an even-handed regulation that promotes the legitimate,
strong public interest in promoting the stability and continuity of the primary
permanent home. ' 597 The case was affirmed. 5 8
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.599 The issue here is whether an equitable lien
can be placed on a homestead. 600
In this case, the parties were divorced from each other and had
remained friendly after the divorce. 6 1 Mr. Spridgeon purchased a condo and
performed renovations on it for Mrs. Spridgeon.
It was determined by the
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id.
Reinish, 765 So. 2d at 207.
Id. at210.
Id.
Id. at210-11.
Id. at 215.
Reinish, 765 So. 2d at 215.
Id.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trial court that Mr. and Mrs. Spridgeon had agreed that this was to be a loan
to Mrs. Spridgeon that she would repay by getting a conventional loan with a
603
bank and paying the proceeds to Mr. Spridgeon.
The court looked to the case of Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass'n v
Fishbein0° in which the wife received the homestead in a divorce.6 5 In that
case, the husband had forged her name onto a note from the savings and loan
company. 6 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that an equitable lien
should be placed on the property to the extent the funds were used to pay
down the previous mortgage on the property. 607 The court held that Ms.
Fishbein was in no worse position than she would have been if the mortgage
had not been paid off.6 8
In this case, the judge followed Fishbein. 9 Here, the judge ruled that
an equitable lien was proper to prevent unjust enrichment and that Mrs.
Spridgeon was
no worse off than she would have been had she honored her
610
agreement.
XVI. INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Department of Environmental Protection v. Youel. 61' The trial court
awarded judgment for the plaintiff based upon a finding that there had been
a temporary taking when the Department improperly asserted jurisdiction
and imposed612development conditions that deprived the landowner of all use
of the land.
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a
final notice of violation to the landowner, but the landowner never appealed,
so she is bound by the finding that the violation existed. 613 "Basically, the
trial court's finding of a temporary taking was predicated upon a theory of
estoppel-i.e., that DEP misled Youel in regard to permitting and
mitigation. 61 4 Equitable estoppel can only be applied to the state in

603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.

Id.
619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993).
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
Fishbein,619 So. 2d at 270.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
Id.
787 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924.
Id.
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exceptional cases. 615 Essential to the claim is proof that the reliance was on
the positive act of an authorized official. 616 However, the record lacked
those elements. 617 Youel was never denied a development permit because
she never tried to get a development permit, and the official with
61 8 whom she
was dealing was not even in the permitting division of the DEP.
Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami.619 Two cases were joined for
consideration by the Supreme Court of Florida. 620 Both involved the forcible
closing of multiple dwelling unit structures by a Nuisance Abatement Board
following the finding of a pattern of illegal activity on the premises. 62 1 The
Supreme Court of Florida, in a unanimous opinion, upheld the action of the
Nuisance Abatement Board in one case but not in the other. 6 2 The court
first concluded that the temporary closing of a motel or a rental apartment
building might constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment so as to
require the payment of compensation. 3 The prospective regulation did not
change that conclusion. 6 2 The court approved the district court's reliance
on Lucas.6 25 There had been no physical invasion of the properties, but the
owners had been deprived of the beneficial use of their properties for the
proscribed time because the structures could not be reasonably
used for any
626
but the prohibited uses during the period of the prohibition.
A critical question was whether the governmental action fit within the
nuisance exception. 627 If the activity was a public nuisance, it could have
been prohibited by a court at common law.62' Consequently, governmental
action preventing that nuisance activity would not be a taking under the Fifth
29
Amendment.6
Both and
cases
illegal prostitution
activities: one
case asinvolved
sales of illegal drugs
theinvolved
other involved
as well
illegal

615.
616.
617.
618.

Id. at 924-25.
Youel, 787 So. 2d at 925.
Id.
Id.

619. 26 Fla. L. Weekly S469 (July 13, 2001).
620. Id.
621. Id.

622. Id. at S472.
623. Id. at S470.
624. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S471.

625. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
626. Id. at S471-72.
627. Id. at S472.
628. Id.
629. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.
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So both would fit within the nuisance exception. 631
drug sales and usage.
However, "[ilt is well settled in this State that injunctions issued to abate
public nuisances must be specifically tailored to abate the objectionable
conduct, without unnecessarily infringing upon the conduct of a lawful
enterprise." 632 The nuisance exception had the same limits. The record
revealed that in the Miami case, 633 the record supported the Board's
conclusion that the operation of the motel "had become inextricably
,634 The only way to
intertwined with the drug and prostitution activity ....
prevent the nuisance activity was to close the motel, so that order was
upheld. 635 However, in the St. Petersburg case, 636 the record had evidence of
only two cocaine sales.637 Consequently, closing the entire apartment house
was far beyond what was necessary to prevent future sales and, in fact,
prohibited legal activity as well as the illegal. 638 Such an overly broad order
could not fit within the nuisance exception, so it could not be allowed to
stand.6 39
Millender v. Departmentof Transportation.6" In 1975, the Department
of Transportation moved the channel in the Carrabelle River.' The change
caused the landowner's river front land to begin eroding.6 2 After the
hurricane of 1985, state agents issued to the landowner, along with many
others, permits to put in sea walls.' 3 However, after the seawall was
completed, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection cited the
seawall as illegal. 6 4 Eight years of litigation followed.6 5 The Department
of Environmental Protection finally prevailed, and in 1993, the landowner
was forced to remove the seawall. 646 Without the seawall, the erosion
continued and the landowner said, "[o]ur property is vanishing, going in the
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Keshbro, Inc.,

26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.

635. Id.

636. City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger, 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
637. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. 774 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
641. Id. at 768.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 771 n.4.
644. Id.
645. Millender,774 So. 2d at 768.
646. Id.
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river, washing down the river ....Our docks is (sic) torn down, our
buildings is falling in,......7 The landowner brought this inverse
condemnation suit for damages and an injunction. 648 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the Department of Transportation based9 on the statute
of limitations, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed.6
Under the Continuing Tort Theory, an injunction may be granted to
prevent further tortious conduct even though the statute of limitations would
bar suit for the original tort. 65° Where the tort is a continuing one, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the last tortious act.651' Therefore,
the trial court should not have ruled as a matter of law that the landowner
652
could not get injunctive relief under these circumstances.
Furthermore, the district court recognized the Dickinson Stabilization
653
That doctrine is based on the United States Supreme Court's
Doctrine.
1947 decision in United States v. Dickinson. s It provided that the statute of
limitations for inverse condemnation does not begin to run until the situation
"becomes stabilized., 65 5 While the doctrine had never been officially
adopted in Florida, it had been cited in one earlier Florida case. 656 This court
found that the doctrine was sound and should be applied in Florida, but it did
certify the question of the doctrine's viability in Florida to the Supreme
Court of Florida. 7 Furthermore, the district court concluded the doctrine
should be applied in this case because the landowner was the victim of an
unforeseeable future event, the order of the Department of Environmental
Regulation, that prevented the landowner from stopping the erosion with a
seawall. 58
647. Id.at 768 n.2.
648. Id. at 768.
649. Id.
650. Millender, 774 So. 2d at 769.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 771.
653. Id. at 769.
654. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
655. Id. at 749.
656. See Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194, 200 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
657. The exact question certified as being of great public importance was: "DOES
THE DOCTRINE STATED IN UNITED STATES V.DICKINSON, 331 U.S. 745 (1947),
APPLY IN AN APPROPRIATE FLORIDA CASE SO AS TO DELAY THE ACCRUAL OF
AN ACTION FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?"
Millender, 774 So. 2d at 771 (citations omitted).
658. Id.
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Sayfle v. Department of Transportation.
In order to encourage
abutting property owners to donate rights of way for the construction of
Alligator Alley across southern Florida, the following language was inserted
into the donation deeds: "Reserving to the Grantor, his heirs or assigns, the
right of access from his remaining property to any service road which may
be constructed on the outer 50 feet of the right of way described above."
This gave those abutting landowners access to a service road, if one ran
parallel to Alligator Alley. 66' Generally, the service road did exist and had
an entrance to the highway at two-mile intervals. 62 Years later, the
Department expinded Alligator Alley into a modem multilane, high speed,
limited access highway, Interstate-75.66 3 To do so, the Department acquired
an additional 125-foot-wide strip on the southern side of Alligator Alley. 566
The plaintiffs here claimed compensation based on their loss of access. 5
The trial court had granted summary judgment to the Department based on
an earlier case that had denied claims for compensation to landowners on the
north side of 1-75 .666 However, the district court found that case
distinguishable because the claimants here had land on the south side, the
side on which the Department had expanded.667 In effect, the claimants here
had lost their easement to the abutting land where the service road might be
built and that was a compensable loss.668
Departmentof EnvironmentalProtectionv. Burgess.66 9 The landowner
acquired undeveloped wetlands in 1956.670 He had the vague idea that the
land would appreciate in value and thought it would be a good investment. 671
Until 1992, he used the land for occasional nature walks and fishing.672 That
year he decided to develop the land. 673 He subdivided it into smaller tracts
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
1989)).
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.

770 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sayfie, 770 So. 2d at 194.
Id.
Id. (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Edwards, 545 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
Id. at 195.
Id.
772 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 542.
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and put them up for sale.674 He also made plans to build a large wooden
dock, boardwalk, and A-framed camping shelter. 675 To build the camping
shelter, he needed a dredge and fill permit from the Department of
Environmental Protection, but his application was refused. 676 Rather than
677
appeal, he filed this action claiming inverse condemnation of his property.
The landowner based his claim on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.678 The district court, however, pointed out that in Lucas the state
trial court had determined that the regulation had rendered the land
valueless. 679 That determination had not been challenged on appeal, so the
United States Supreme Court had not based its decision on that unchallenged
680
premise.
In contrast, in this case, the Department vigorously challenged
his claim that the land was valueless or that the regulation effected a
regulatory taking. 681 The district court concluded that no taking had
occurred.6 82
To constitute a regulatory taking, the regulation must deprive the
landowner of all, or substantially all, economically viable use of his land. s
That question turned on whether the permit denial "interfered with his
reasonable, distinct, investment-backed expectations, held at the time he
purchased the property.' 684 The record showed that, at the time he bought
the land, he had only a general hope of finding a way to make a profit from
the land in the future. 685 He did not have a specific plan that he was putting
into effect at that time. 686 However, a landowner does not have a right to
make a profit from his investment. 687 He also had an expectation that he
would be able to use the land for recreation. 688 The permit denial does not
interfere with the way he used the land for recreation for over thirty years.6 9
674.
675.
676.
677.

Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.

678. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 542.
679. Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 542.

680. id.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.

Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 543.
Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 543.
Id.

686. Id.
687. Id. at 544.

688. Id.
689. Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 544.
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It merely prevents him from changing that recreational use.690 In fact, he
could still build his dock and expand the recreational use without the
permit. 691 Consequently, the landowner failed to prove his case for inverse
condemnation. 692
State Department of Transportationv. Gayety Theatres, Inc.69 A road
improvement project included the building of a concrete median down the
middle of a busy thoroughfare. 4 Before the project, drivers coming north
or south could turn directly into the theater's parking lot; similarly, patrons
leaving the theater could turn directly north or south. 95 After the project
was completed, northbound patrons would have to go a half mile beyond the
theater, make a u-turn, and come back half a mile in the southbound lane to
enter the theater's parking lot. 696 The theater sued for loss of access and won
in the trial court.69 The district court, however, reversed. 698
A landowner is not entitled to recover compensation merely because
699
government action has caused a lessening of traffic in an abutting road.
Compensation would only be due where access to the property had been
substantially diminished.7 Whether that has happened is a question for the
judge.70 This case fit squarely within the first rule because the project had
merely modified the flow of the northbound traffic.70 2 The theater still had
the same access to the roadway even if it was only from the southbound
lane.70 3
State Department of Transportationv. Suit City of Aventura.704 The
landowner operated a large shopping center at the intersection of two busy
roads. 70 5 To alleviate the severe traffic problems at the intersection, the
Department changed the traffic patterns and built elevated lanes to divert
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Id.
693. 781 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

694. Id. at 1126.
695. Id.
696. ld.
697. Id. at 1126-27.
698. Gayety Theaters Inc., 781 So. 2d at 1128.
699. Id. at 1127.

700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id. at 1127-28.
703. Gayety Theaters Inc., 781 So. 2d at 1127-28.

704. 774 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
705. Id. at 10.
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traffic over the intersection. 0 6 The project resulted in the closing of one
entrance to the mall and an obstruction of the view of the mall.
The
7
08
landowner sought compensation for both.
The district court found both to
be noncompensable.
Closing the entrance would be compensable only if it substantially
deprived the landowner of access to the property. 710 Here, the landowner
still had two entrances on each of the busy roadways. 7 11 In addition, the
project had, to some effect, improved the access by at least one of those
712
71 3
entrances.
So, there was no compensable loss of access.
Nor did
building the elevated lanes, which to some extent, blocked the light, air, and
view of the mall, constitute a compensable taking.71 4 The Department was
validly exercising its police power in redesigning the traffic patterns to
715
protect the public welfare.
To the extent that this interfered with the rights
of the landowner, it would be compensable only if the interference was
unreasonable. 716 The court concluded that "[r]educing the traffic distress at
this intersection by elevated lanes is certainly1 7within the discretion of the
DOT and is well within the bounds of reason."
7
State Department of Transportation v. Kirkland.718
The landowner
operated a restaurant with direct access to State Road 77.719 A short distance
from the restaurant, State Road 77 proceeded to cross the bay by a bridge.
Then the Department built a new bridge and relocated State Road 77 to cross
the bay by the new bridge. 721 The old bridge was closed and converted into a
722
fishing
pier.from
That
partState
of old
State77,Road
wasreached
renamed
and could
be reached
the new
Road
but it77now
a dead
end atstill
the

706.
707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Suit City of Aventura, 774 So. 2d at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Suit City of Aventura, 774 So. 2d at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id.
772 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pier.723 The restaurant parking lot still opened onto that road in exactly the
same way as it had before, but the landowner brought this inverse condemnation action.724 The district court concluded that no compensable taking had
72 That
occurred. 72 What occurred here was the mere redirection of traffic.727
access.
of
landowner
the
was not a taking because it did not deprive
VLX Properties, Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, Inc. 728 Glenn Abby
Golf Course ("GAGC") owned a golf course. 729 VLX owned a portion of
James Pond which was adjacent to and, to some degree, within the confines
of the golf course. 730 GAGC was prohibited from watering the golf course
with water from its wells, so it entered into a contract with the Public Utility
for reclaimed wastewater.731 However, when the Public Utility began
discharging the reclaimed wastewater, James Pond was flooded.
VLX
claimed the flooding caused the water quality in the pond to deteriorate
seriously. 733 The trial court concluded that wastewater had been discharged
directly into James Pond but that did not amount to a taking because VLX
73 4
had not been deprived of all reasonable and beneficial use of its property.
The findings of fact were not challenged on appeal, but VLX claimed that
the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard. 735 The three-judge panel
of the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.73 6
The court noted that "a distinction has been made between categories of
takings in inverse condemnation cases. 737 For example, taking may occur
"by physical occupation, flooding, governmental regulation, and taking of
access rights."738 The legal standard to be applied in determining whether a
taking occurred depends on which category of taking is alleged.739 In this
723. Kirkland,772 So. 2d at 567.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 568.

726. Id.

727. Id.
728. 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

729. Id. at 506.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. VLX Props., Inc. v. S. States Utils., Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1745 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. July 21, 2000).
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. Id. at D1746.
736. Id.
737. VLX Props.,Inc., 25 Fa. L Weekly at D1745.
738. Id. at D1745-46.
739. Id. at D1746.
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case, the trial court considered the allegation to be that a taking that had been
effected by flooding which was caused by the Public Utility.7 4 That would
be an indirect invasion and, consequently, it required the claimant to prove
that the flooding had deprived the claimant of all reasonable and beneficial
use of the land.74 ' However, close analysis revealed that the claim was really
that the Public Utility directly occupied VLX's land by discharging
74
74
A direct invasion is a per se taking. 1
wastewater directly into the pond.
The claimant need only show entry upon its land for more than a momentary
period, under warrant or color of legal authority that devoted it to public
use.7 " Those factors were clearly established in the trial court's findings of
fact.745 Any showing of the size of the encroachment or the economic loss it
caused would only be elements of damages, not essentials to establishing
liability. 746 In sum, the trial court had erred in characterizing this case as one
where flooding was alleged to having caused the taking when, in fact, it was
a case in which the taking had caused the flooding.747
The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted a motion for rehearing en
banc.7 " The panel's opinion was withdrawn, and it decided to recede from
its 1997 decision in this very litigation. 749 The en banc opinion
characterized the dispute as VLX's attempt to claim damages for the
invasion of the wastewater into those parts of the pond that it had obtained
after it had agreed to a flowage easement.7 50 Over Judge Sharp's and Judge
Peterson's spirited dissents, the court found a flowage easement existed
because it had been intended by all the necessary parties based on the
facts. 75 1 The court then
invoked the "tipsy coachman" rule to uphold the
752
decision.
court's
trial
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. VLX Prop.Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D1745-46.
743. Id. at D1746.
744. Id. (citing Shick v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987), which in turn quoted from Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1961)).
745. Id.
746. Id.
747. VLX Prop. Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D1745.

748. VLX Prop., Inc. v. S. States Util., Inc., 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001), referred to by the court as "VLXI." See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman,
Property Law: 1998 Survey of FloridaLaw, 23 NOVA L. REV. 229, 275 (1998).
749. VLX Prop., Inc., 792 So. 2d at 506.

750. Id. at 506-07.
751. Id. at 507.
752. Id. at 509.
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The "tipsy coachman" rule is that a decision that produces the right
result will be affirmed even if it was reached for the wrong reasons. In this
case, the trial court had ruled for the defendants because, it decided, no
taking had occurred. The trial court should have ruled for the defendants
because they had a flowage easement which allowed them to disburse the
wastewater as they had. The "tipsy coachman" rule may be, to most of us,
more interesting than the other parts of this tortured litigation. The phrase is
based on a verse, first quoted from Goldsmith's RETALIATION for this
purpose in 1879 by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
The pupil of impulse, it forc'd him along
His conduct still right, with his argument wrong;
Still aiming at honor, yet fearing to roam,
753
The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home;
In essence, if the coach gets home safely, the fact that the coachman was
tipsy becomes irrelevant. This verse was repeated by the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1963754 and, therefore, the "tipsy coachman" rule has become part
of our legal culture.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Bailey v. Brickell Key Centre-FBEC,L.L C.755 The landlord brought an

action for possession, damages and recovery on a guaranty.

6

The trial court

issued a final judgment of eviction and ordered a writ of possession to
issue.757 The judgment reserved jurisdiction on collateral matters that

included, but were not limited to, attorney's fees."
The landlord later
requested and was granted a judgment for damages against the tenant's
guarantor.759 The guarantor appealed on the basis that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to issue and the district court of appeal reversed. 760 The eviction
753. Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (1879). For the complete poem, see
RETALIATION: A POEM which is reprinted with some explanatory notes on BOB'S
BYWAY at http://shoga.wwa.com/-rgslxgoldsmi.htm or http://cluster.wwa.com/-rgslxgold
smi.htm.
754. Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So. 2d 494,497 (Fla. 1963).
755. 778 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id.

759. Id.
760. Bailey, 778 So. 2d at 386.
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order here was final as to damages because there was no reservation of
jurisdiction on that issue.761 Once a trial court issued that final judgment, it
lost jurisdiction to award further damages. 7762
76
Beacon Property Management, Inc. v. PNR, Inc.
PNR bought a
restaurant. 764 As part of the transaction, the commercial lease for the
restaurant space was assigned to PNR. 7 65 The corporate landlord was run by
two shareholders who were also the corporate officers, identified herein as
"A" and "B. 766 PNR alleged that A induced PNR to complete the
transaction by certain statements regarding the landlord's future plans for the
premises.767 Unfortunately, the landlord allowed the premises to fall into
such a bad state that one wall collapsed. 76 8 After repairs were made, PNR
tried to reopen the restaurant, but gave up after a short time. 769 The landlord
evicted the tenant from the closed restaurant.770
The tenant then filed this suit seeking damages from the corporate
landlord, the company that managed the premises, and A and B. 771 The
landlord did not appear to defend and A settled.7 72 That left B and the
management company to face the charges of violating Florida's Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 773 fraud, negligent representation, tortious
interference with contract, and wrongful eviction. 774 The jury verdict
awarded PNR compensatory and punitive damages, but the district court
reversed.775
The district court held that the alleged conduct here could not constitute
a violation of the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 776 That act
provides that: "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or
practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.

Id. at 386.
Id.
785 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 566 n.1.
Id. at 566.
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 566.

769. Id.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.

Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 501.204 (2001).
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 566.
Id.
Id. at 567.
FLA. STAT.
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trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Mt The court noted the
plain meaning of these terms and concluded, "[a] single instance of doing
something does not make it a method or a practice. ' 778 Here the evidence
was limited to a single lease, so a violation had not been established." 79
Having reached that conclusion, the court found it unnecessary to address
the question of whether the act even applied to commercial leases, a question
that had been raised by the landlord.
The district court also found that a case of fraud or negligent
representation had not been proven against these defendants.78 1 The alleged
misrepresentations had been made by A. 782 There was no 783evidence that A
was acting on behalf of B or the management company.
A had been
acting on his own behalf or on behalf of the corporate landlord.7s There
was no basis for applying any legal theory which might hold shareholders of
the corporate landlord personally liable for the statements of the corporation
or another investor.785
The claim of tortious interference with a business relationship was
initially based on the claim that the landlord's conduct had prevented the
restaurant from attracting future patrons. 786 On its face, this claim should
have failed because the tort requires the existence of a present relationship,
not merely hopes of a future one.78 7 PNR also tried to claim that B and the
management company tortiously interfered with the lease.788 That also failed
to satisfy one of the elements of the tort which was that the interference must
be done by a third party. 789 B and the management company were not
strangers to the lease transaction.
Their involvement was on behalf of the
791
landlord and the conduct complained of, in fact, benefited the landlord.

777. § 501.204 (1).
778. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 568.

779. Id.at 567.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 568.

782. Id.
783. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 568.

784. Id.
785. Id.

786. Id.
787. Id. at 569.
788. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 569.

789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id.
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Finally, the wrongful eviction claim against B and the management
company was also fatally defective. 792 Neither B nor the management
company had brought the eviction action.793 It had been brought on behalf of
the corporate landlord by A. 9 So any wrongful eviction claim would have
to be brought against A or the landlord.7 95
Camena Investments & Property Management Corp. v. Cross.796
Tenant leased the property as the location for her restaurant.
The leasing
agent assured her that she would be able to open for business by October
1St.798 However, when the tenant sought approval of her plans, she learned
that there were zoning and restrictive covenant obstacles. 799 Eventually, she
was able to open the restaurant, but it was not a sucdess.
When she failed
80 1
to pay the rent, the landlord brought an eviction action in the county court.
The tenant raised the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement.802 The
parties later agreed that the defense could be stricken and a default judgment
for possession entered in favor of the landlord.80 3
The landlord then brought an action for the unpaid rent in circuit
court. 8 04 The tenant counterclaimed for damages based on fraud in the
inducement and breach of contract. 80 5 The landlord first claimed that the
counterclaim was barred by res judicata based on the judgment in the
eviction action.808°6 That argument was rejected. 807 The district court concluded that the tenant had voluntarily abandoned fraud in the inducement as
a defense. 808 It likened that to taking a voluntary dismissal which is without
prejudice because it is not an adjudication on the merits. 8°9 Thus, res
judicata would be inapplicable.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.

Id.
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 569-70.
Id. at 570.
Id.
791 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cross, 791 So. 2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cross, 791 So. 2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597.
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The landlord also claimed that the tenant could not claim fraud in the
inducement because she took with notice of what was on the public
810
1
It asserted that Pressman v. Wolf n stood for the proposition that
records.
statements concerning public records can never form the basis for a claim of
actionable fraud.812 The district court held that there was no such general
rule.813 The question is whether a person in the plaintiff's position would
have been able to ascertain the true facts by taking reasonable steps such as
checking the public records. 8 14 A buyer acting reasonably would check the
public records. 815 A contractor pulling a permit would be expected to check
the public records. 6 However, "these types of searches are not expected to
be performed as standard procedure by a party entering into a commercial
lease. 8 1 7
The district court did, however, reverse the trial court's dismissal of the
tenant's motion for tax attorney's fees for lack of evidence.818 The tenant
had presented an expert witness who testified to having reviewed the
agreement between the tenant and her attciney, what the agreed rate was,
and that he had reviewed the time sheets kept by the attorney.819 The tenant
had moved for rehearing on the attorneys' fees issue, but that had been
denied. 82
"We fail to appreciate what was missing in [the tenant's]
8 21
presentation of evidence regarding the amount of attorney's fees .... ,
stated the district court. At the very least, the trial court should have granted
the motion for rehearing and denying that motion was an abuse of discretion
that required reversal.
Horizon Medical Group, P.A. v. City Center of Charlotte County,
Ltd.82 2 The commercial tenant signed a five year lease in March 1999, but
less than nine months later the landlord filed this action alleging that tenant

810. Id.
811. 732 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
812. Cross, 791 So. 2d at 597 (citing Pressman,732 So. 2d at 361).
813. Id.
814. Id.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Cross, 791 So. 2d at 598.
818. Camena Inv. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595, 598 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
819. Id
820. Id.

821. Id.
822. 779 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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had breached the lease. 823 The tenant admitted that it had abandoned the
premises and owed back rent, so the trial court entered a final summary
judgment. 82 The damages awarded by the court included unpaid back rent
and accelerated future rent for the entire term and the cost of reletting the
premises. 82
The possibility of reletting was the basis for the partial
reversal. 826 A landlord is not entitled to the windfall of collecting rent for a
property from two different tenants. 827 So if the landlord did relet the
premises and collect rent from a third party for time covered by this lease,
the tenant was entitled to credit against the accelerated future rent. The trial
court was ordered to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of considering a
motion by the tenant for an accounting to consider any credits to which it
might become entitled
based upon the landlord reletting the premises to a
828
replacement tenant.
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act was amended during
the 2001 legislative session. 829 The first change is to give the landlord more
time to notify the tenant of an intent to impose a claim against the security
deposit. Now the landlord has thirty days, rather than fifteen, to send the
tenant notice by certified mail."'
The Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act has also
been modified. 83' This act provides the method by which the landlord may
dispose of personal property left behind by the tenant without incurring any
risk that the tenant may later reappear and assert a conversion claim against
the landlord. 832 The lease may now contain a provision which relieves the
landlord of the statutory duty to give notice that personal property has been
left behind to the tenant or any other person the landlord thinks to be the
personal property's owner. 833 Under the prior law, if the landlord reasonably
believed that the personal property left behind was worth less than $250,
then the landlord could simply keep it rather than have to sell it at a public
823. Id. at 546.

824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Horizon Med. Group, 779 So. 2d at 546.

828. Id.
829. FLA.
830. FLA.

STAT. § 83.49 (2001).
STAT. § 83.49(3)(a) (2001)

as amended by Ch. 2001-179, § 1, 2001 Fla.

Sess. Law Serv. 581 (West).
831. FLA. STAT. §§ 715.10-.111 (2000).
832. Id.
833. See

FLA. STAT.

Sess. Law Serv. 581 (West).

§ 83.67(3) (2001) as amended by Ch. 2001-179, § 2, 2001 Fla.
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sale.8 34 That threshold has been raised to $500. 835 The notice forms sent to

former tenants
and other possible owners have been modified to reflect this
836
change.

The legislature has also taken steps to provide further protections to
members of the Armed Forces of the United States. If the tenant is a
member of the military whose post is moved more than thirty-five miles
from the rental unit or who is unexpectedly deactivated, that tenant may
terminate the lease upon thirty days notice to the landlord. 7 The tenant
must include a copy of the military orders with the termination notice that is
sent to the landlord to invoke this provision.8 38 If the member of the militar8
dies while on active duty, the lease may be terminated in a similar fashion. 79
Following termination, the landlord shall be entitled only to the prorated
rent.8 ° If the lease was terminated more than fourteen days before the tenant
was to take possession, the landlord is not entitled to any rent.841However, if
the landlord has suffered actual damages due to the early termination of the
lease, the landlord may recover liquidated damages, although the amount
is
842
limited if the lease was terminated after a period less than six months.
XVIII. LIENS
Slachter v. Swanson.843 The issue in this case is whether a subsequent
property purchaser's claim to property takes priority over the holder of a
disputed mortgage.84
In this case, a mortgage company assigned a mortgage to its former
president, mortgagee.845 The company filed a foreclosure action against the
mortgagors which was dismissed with prejudice." The mortgagors then
sued the company for wrongful foreclosure and fraud, and were awarded
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 715.109(1) (2000).
§ 715.109(1) (2001).

Id.

§ 83.682(1)(a) (2001).
Id.
§ 83.682 (1)(b).
FLA. STAT. § 83.682 (2) (2001).
Id.
§ 83.682 (3).
26 Fla. L. Weekly D586 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001).
Id.
FLA. STAT.

845. Id.

846. Id.

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:109

damages. 7 In order to collect on the judgment, the mortgagors got a trial
court order discharging the note and mortgage as paid in full. 4
The
discharge judgment was duly recorded.849 But, the discharge judgment
ultimately was reversed by- a Supreme Court of Florida decision that dealt
with numerous investors and appellants although the spelling and phonetics
of the name were not the same. 850 Thereafter, the mortgagors transferred the
property by warranty deed to appellee. 85 After this transfer, the trial court
vacated the discharge judgment.
Appellant then sued appellee to foreclose
on the 8 roperty and appellee's partial summary judgment motion was
granted.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment because appellant failed to
show appellee had knowledge of appellant's claim that the mortgage had
been reinstated after it was supposedly discharged, and thus, did not
establish he had implied actual knowledge of that reinstatement or that it was
readily ascertainable because of the difference in names in the Supreme
Court of Florida decision. 854 Therefore, the appellate court held that he was
a bona fide purchaser of the property whose
claim to that property took
855
priority over appellant's disputed mortgage.
Legislative amendments to changes in section 55.10 of the Florida
Statutes, revising the duration period of certain liens, provide in
subparagraph (1) that if a certified copy was first recorded between July 1,
1987 and June 30, 1994, the judgment, order, or decree is valid for an initial
period of seven years from the date recorded. 856 If the certified copy is first
recorded on or after July 1, 1994, it is a lien for an initial period of ten years
from the date of recording. 857 Subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) clarify the rerecording language. 85 8 The lien in subsection (1) or an extension of that lien
as provided by subsection (2), may be extended for an additional ten years. 859
As an example, if a lien was recorded between July 1, 1987 and June 30,
847.
848.
849.
850.
851.
852.
853.

Id.
Slachter,26 Fla. L. Weekly at D586.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Slachter, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D586.

854. Id. at D587.
855. Id.

856.
857.
858.
859.

S.B. 178, 102d Sess. (Fla. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1987 one can re-record it twice to reach the twenty year statute of limitations
provided under section 55.081.

XIX. Lis PENDENS
Seligman v. North American Mortgage Co.860 The issue is whether
notice of a lis pendens creates a property right that has priority over a
mortgage, later recorded, when the property is part of the marital property in
a marriage dissolution case. 861
Appellee tried to foreclose on its mortgage to appellant.
The
mortgage in question was executed by appellant's former husband as a single
man after appellant filed a notice of lis pendens regarding the property, upon
her petition for dissolution of their marriage. 863
Appellant properly recorded the notice of lis pendens and also properly
procured a valid extension of the lis pendens.864 The lis pendens remained in
effect, and was not dissolved at the time appellee's
mortgage
was
,
•
865 executed
and recorded and at the time appellee' s foreclosure suit was filed. Because
of the common law doctrine of pendente lite, the court in a dissolution of
marriage proceeding, had jurisdiction over the property until final judgment,
and whoever purchased or encumbered the property took subject to the
dissolution judgment. 86 The former husband was not allowed to encumber
or alienate the property pending litigation. 867 Appellee had record notice of
the pending dissolution and should have known the husband was not in fact
single. 868 This court held that the fact that the notice of lis pendens referred
to the action filed as a dissolution of marriage and listed the property at issue
was sufficient for the requirements of section 48.23(1)(a) of the 1997
Florida Statutes to set forth the relief sought.869 The trial court's decision
87
was reversed.
0 The matter was remanded for entry of judgment for
T
appellant.17
860. 781 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
861. Id. at 1161.
862. ld. at 1160.

863.
864.
865.
866.
867.

Id.
Id. at 1163.
Seligman, 781 So. 2d at 1163.

Id.
Id.

868. Id.

869. Id.
870. Seligman, 781 So. 2d at 1164.
871. Id.
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XX. MORTGAGES

Michel v. Beau Rivage Beach Resort, Inc.872 The issue in this case is
whether a lien on a home is proper when it represents security for a
commission earned by the real estate broker. 8 "
74
In this case, the broker earned a commission on the sale of a property.
The broker allowed the seller to be paid the funds owed to him, so the
purchaser could get a loan in the amount of the commission from the
875
seller.
The trial court construed section 475.42(1)0) of the Florida
Statutes, which prohibits a broker or salesman from placing a mortgage in
the public records in order to collect a commission, to disallow what
occurred here. 6 The appellate court found that the broker was placing a
lien on the property. 7 Here, the broker allowed the seller, who was
obligated to pay the commission, to use the commission to grant a loan to the
purchaser. 878 The appellate court held that the funds were the seller's to do
with as he pleased, and that the trial court had misconstrued the statute in
880
this instance.879 Therefore, the dppellate court reversed the trial court.
8 81
Suntrust Bank v. Riverside National Bank of Florida.
The issue in
this case involved the priority of a first mortgagee's refinanced loan. 8 2
In 1993, appellant recorded a balloon first mortgage of $148,500.883 In
1995, appellee recorded a $100,000 second mortgage.884 In 1998, appellant
refinanced the first mortgage, lending $136,800. 8 The sums paid off the
original mortgage and appellant recorded a satisfaction of the original first
886
mortgage
andmortgage
its new mortgage.
Appellant
that its new
mortgage
was the first
because its title
search assumed
did not disclose
the appellee's

872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.

774 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902; see also FLA STAT. § 475.42(1)0).
Michel, 774 So. 2d at 902.
Id.

879. Id.
880. Id.
881. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D513 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001), withdrawn, 26 Fla. L.
Weekly 2109 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2001) (filling an identical opinion).
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id.
886. Suntrust Bank, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D513.
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mortgage. 8 7 When the property went into foreclosure, appellant discovered
the priority difficulties. 8 8 The trial court denied appellant relief.8s9
The appeals court reversed, holding that the previous two cases upon
which the trial court relied were incorrect, and that appellant was entitled to
relief under the equitable subrogation doctrine.8 g9 However, the appellate
court held that appellant was only entitled to equitable subrogation to the
extent that appellee would be no worse off than it would have been if
appellant's original mortgage had not been satisfied. 891
XXI• OPTIONS
Sander v. Ball.8 92 Buyer was interested in seller's land, but the parties
anticipated that part of the seller's land would be taken by the county. So,
buyer purchased a purchase option. 894 The price would be $483,351, but
provided that the buyer would get credit for whatever the county paid for the
price of $30,000 times
acreage taken.895 Furthermore, it placed a maximum
•896"nfute
The option further
the number of acres left after the condemnation.
provided that it would continue until October 24, 1998, but would be
automatically extended until the seller had received the condemnation
proceeds.897 So, in effect, the option did not include a time limit. Regretting
the deal, the seller filed this action to have the option declared null and
void. 9 8 The buyer apparently counterclaimed for reformation and won in
the trial court. 899 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed. 9°
The court concluded that the option was void because it violated the
Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation. 901 Consequently, the
court did not consider the assertion that the option violated the Rule Against
887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at D514.
Suntrust Bank, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D514-15.
781 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

893. Id. at 528.

894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.

Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Sander,781 So. 2d at 528.
Id.at 528.
Id.

900. Id. at 531.
901. Id.
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Perpetuities. The maximum price set by the option made it sufficiently
similar to the fixed price repurchase option held invalid in Inglehart v.
Phillips.9°2 As the Supreme Court of Florida said in Inglehart, "[t]he
validity or invalidity of a restraint depends upon its long-term effect on the
improvement and marketability of the property. Once that effect is
determined, common sense should dictate whether it is reasonable or
unreasonable. ,9 03 An option with a price cap and no time limit failed that
test.9°
The rule could not be avoided by reforming the option as the trial court
had done. 90 5 It simply added a time limit based upon circumstances in which
the agreement was reached. 9 6 Reformation, however, is available only to
make the writing reflect what the parties had actually agreed. 90 7 It cannot be
used to cure a defect in that agreement. 9°8 Here, the parties had not even
discussed a time limit for the option, so the9 court could not supply the term
under the guise of reforming the document. W
XXII. SALES
Bunner v. Talbot.9 1° Seller was a real estate broker. 9 1 Buyer was an
91 2
attorney who had represented the seller in previous real estate matters.
Seller was in financial trouble. 1 3 A valuable property was encumbered by
liens and mortgages.9 14 Worse, it was about to be auctioned off for unpaid
taxes. 915 They agreed to the following deal: buyer would loan seller the
money to pay off the tax deficit and seller would sell the land to a land trust
that buyer would create. 916 The contract, which buyer hired another attorney
902. 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
903. Sander, 781 So. 2d at 529 (quoting Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614-15
(Fla. 1980)).
904. Id.
905. Id. at 530.
906. Id.
907. Id.
908. Sander, 781 So. 2d at 530.
909. Id.
910. 784 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
911. Id. at539.
912. Id.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 539.
916. Id.
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to draft, required seller to deliver marketable title. 1 7 An addendum provided
that if the sale was not consummated, the seller would give buyer a note918for
the tax money advanced and secure that with a mortgage on the property.
Buyer did advance the cash seller needed, and seller used that to pay off
the taxes. 919 Then, it appears that seller had second thoughts about the
wisdom of the deal because his accountant advised him that the price was
too Iow. 9 2° Buyer insisted on closing and had a title search done.92' Several
liens and encumbrances were discovered and seller was notified that they
would have to be cleared. 922 Seller claimed he did not have the money to do
that and refused to close, so buyer filed suit for specific performance.
Seller's first defense was impossibility, that is, that he could not deliver
marketable title.924 That defense was rejected.?
The marketable title
provision was in the contract to protect -the buyer, not the seller.926 It could
be waived by the buyer.927 In this case, the buyer had done so by insisting on
closing. 92 The addendum requiring the seller to execute a note and
mortgage for the money advanced did not change that. 92 9 The addendum
was only designed to provide buyer protection against the loss of the money
she had already advanced if the sale was not completed due to unmarketable
title.930
Seller also asserted that buyer was the trustee for a trust that had not yet
been created and, therefore, could not bring the action. 931 The district court
pointed out that this argument had not been raised below until the motion for
rehearing.932 Consequently, it had been waived.933 However, the court
offered the dicta that it would not have been a successful argument
917. Id.
918. Id.

919. Id.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.

Buttner,784 So. 2d at 540.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

925. Buttner,784 So. 2d at 540.

926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.

Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 541.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id.
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anyway. 934 Under Florida law, a conveyance may be made to a person as
trustee without reference to any trust document or beneficiary.9 35
Consequently, the plaintiff could have completed the closing by taking title
in a deed to her as trustee. Since she had the ability to close, she could
enforce the contract by specific performance.
Seller also claimed the contract lacked consideration.
This argument
failed because the contract called for buyer to execute a purchase money
mortgage and allow seller to live on the property for two years in addition to
advancing the cash to pay off the back taxes.
Finally, seller asserted that buyer should be denied equitable relief
because she had unclean hands.
The essence of this claim rested on
plaintiff being a lawyer who had represented him in the past and the price
being, allegedly, inadequate. 939 The court found this claim unconvincing. 940
Buyer did not act as a lawyer in this transaction. 941 Another lawyer had been
942
engaged
to draft ,the documents.
All that the record reflects is a 943
case of
,,
seller's remorse" once it had enjoyed part of the benefits of the deal.
Cavallaro v. Stratford Homes.944 The buyers put down a $500 deposit
and signed an agreement reserving a particular lot in the defendant's
development. 945 Under the terms of the agreement, the parties were expected
to enter into a formal construction, purchase, and sale contract which would
provide for the construction of a house by seller on the designated lot and the
subsequent sale of that lot to the buyers. 94 The reservation agreement
provided that if the construction, purchase, and sale contract was not
executed within fourteen days, either party could void the lot reservation
agreement. 947 A dispute arose and the buyers sued for specific performance
of the sales agreement. 94 The seller's defense was that the parties had never
934. Id.
935. FLA. STAT. § 689.07(1) (2001).
936. Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 541.
937. Id.
938. Id.

939. Id.
940. Id.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.

Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 539.
Id.
Id. at 541.
784 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 621.

946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Id.

2001]

Brown / Grohman

reached agreement on the terms of the contract of sale and, even if they had,
enforcement was barred by the Statute
of Frauds.949 The trial court awarded
950
seller.
summary judgment to the
The record below revealed that the parties had gone through several
different sets of plans and pricing calculations. 951 However, they had never
reached
agreement as to the essential terms of construction
•• a final952
,..and .the
951
ultimate price.
Consequently, the summary judgment was affirmed.
The court went on to offer interesting dicta about the Statute of Frauds.95 4 In
this case, there admittedly was not a single document that was signed by the
buyers and the seller. 955 Buyers sought to satisfy the Statute of Frauds by
combining an agreement and addendum that had been signed by them with
the seller's price list.956 Assuming the price list was a writing "signed" by
the seller, the court still found the list insufficient because
there was nothing
957
in the unsigned writing referencing the signed writing.
The court also rejected the attempt to invoke the doctrine of part
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 5 8 When
dealing with a contract for the sale of land, only delivery of possession will
be sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the Statute of
Frauds. 959 In this case, the buyers were never put into possession, so the
doctrine was inapplicable.96°
Furthermore, the seller could not be held liable for breaching an
obligation of good faith or fair dealing.96 Those
962 are duties that are imposed
on a party in the performance of the contract.
However, those duties never
arose because, "in this case.., the
parties
never
reached an agreement or
963
executed an enforceable contract."

949. Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 621.

950.
951.
952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 621.
Id.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 622.
Id.
Id.

962. Id.
963. Id.
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Kroitzsch v. Steele. 964 Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch encountered serious
financial difficulties and lost their home in a mortgage foreclosure sale.9 5
Title was acquired by Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"). 9"
At that point, Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch came into some money and wanted to
buy the house back from FNMA. 967 Under the circumstances of their
financial problems, they believed that they could not make the purchase in
their own names, so they arranged for Varner to be the buyer, using their
money, and then execute a lease to Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch.968 Only Mr.
Kroitzsch signed97 the one-year lease. 969 The tenants never paid rent or a
security deposit. 0
The problem arose when Varner sold the house to the buyers four years
later.971 Varner told them the tenants were residing in the house, but that
they were behind in their rent.972 He also showed them the lease. 973 The
buyers drove by the property and observed that the house was occupied as
they had been told.974 They also checked the public records which
confirmed that Varner was the owner of record and the title seemed to be
unencumbered. 975 After becoming the owners, the buyers were never paid
any rent, so they began this eviction proceeding. 976 The trial court ordered
the eviction of the tenants, but the district court of appeal reversed.977
"[S]uccessors to legal title take title subject to those equitable interests
of which they have notice." 978 The plaintiffs here did not have actual notice
that Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch were the equitable owners of the land rather
than merely delinquent tenants.979 However, there were delinquent tenants
in possession under a written lease that had never been properly executed
and that appeared to have expired years earlier. 980 Thus, "there were
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.

768 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
Id.
ld.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
ld.
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sufficient red flags raised in this residential purchase to require further
inquiry by the [b]uyers. ' '98' But the plaintiffs did not make the inquiry that a
reasonably prudent buyer would have made under the circumstances.982 They
did not contact the tenants to find out what claims they might have. 983 They
did not get an estoppel certificate from the tenants. 9 4 They did not get an
affidavit from the seller before the closing.9 5 They6 did not get title
insurance protecting against the claims of the occupants. 98 All they did was
ask the seller and check the public records.987 That is not sufficient. 9 88
Kroitzsch's interest and
Consequently, they took
989 subject to Mr. and Mrs.
could not evict them.
XXIII. TAXATION
FairhavenSouth, Inc. v. McIntyre.99 0 The issue here is whether the trial
court erred in upholding the property appraiser's denial of Fairhaven's
applications for a homestead exemption on the ground that Fairhaven failed
to establish that the property was used for a charitable purpose. 991
A nonprofit home for the aged qualified for homestead exemption under
section 196.1975 of the 1995 FloridaStatutes if: 1) it qualifies as a not-forprofit corporation under section 501(c)(3) of the InternalRevenue Code; and
either over the age of
2) at least seventy-five percent of its residents are
992
permanently.
or
partially
disabled,
are
sixty-two or
Fairhaven applied for a homestead exemption for the years 1996, 1997,
and 1998, and attached documentation that its corporate charter is not-forprofit and a certificate of exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.993 It also established that at least seventy-five percent of its
residents were over the age of sixty-two or were totally and permanently
981. Id. at 518.
982. Id.

983. Id.
984. Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 518.
985. Id.

986. Plaintiffs did get a tide insurance policy, but it contained the usual exception for
claims of parties in possession. Id.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 518.
990. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1466 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 8, 2001).
991. Id.
992. Id. at D1467.
993. Id.
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disabled, that some portions of the home were used exclusively for religious
or medical purposes, and that at least twenty-five percent of the home's
residents had incomes below the maximum limitation.994 The property
appraiser denied Fairhaven's applications, asserting that Fairhaven must also
"meet the requirements of section 196.195 (determining the profit or
nonprofit status of an applicant) and section 196.196 (determining whether
property is entitled to charitable.., exemption). 995 Fairhaven appealed.9 96
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court should have
based its decision solely on section 196.1975. 997 The appellate court
examined the legislative history of section 196.1975 and Article VII, Section
6(e) of the Florida Constitution in reaching its decision. 99 Prior to 1987, the
exemption of a non profit home for the aged was based on Article VII,
Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution. 999 At that time, property was
required to be used for charitable, educational, literary, scientific, or
religious purposes.1'0 Section 196.1975(7) now provides that subsection 3
relates to Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, and the
remaining subsections implement section 6(e) of the constitution, for
purposes of granting homestead exemptions to homes for the aged. 100 '
Because Fairhaven met the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code
and those of section 196.1975(1) and (2), it was entitled to homestead
exemption for
1996 through 1998, without regard to the "charitable" use of
00 2
the property.
Florida Governmental Utility Authority v. Day. 100 3 The issue here was
whether a property owner must file suit within sixty days of receipt of
assessment when the property owner is a governmental utility.'004 Appellant
appealed a final summary judgment entered by the circuit court against it,
994.
995.
996.
997.

Id.
FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1467.
Id.
Id.

998. Id.

999. Id.
1000. FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1467.
1001. Id. Article VII. Section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution provides: "[b]y general
law and subject to conditions specified therein, the [lIegislature may provide to renters, who
are permanent residents, ad valorem tax relief on all ad valorem tax levies. Such ad valorem
tax relief shall be in the form and amount established by general law." FLA. CONST. art. VII, §

6(e).
1002. FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1467.
1003.784 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1004. Id. at 495.

2001]

Brown / Grohman

the Osceola County property appraiser, and the tax collector, after the court
found appellant's complaint to be untimely. 00 5
The utility was created by an interlocal agreement in accordance with
the Florida Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1969.10 6 The tax collector
disallowed the tax exemption to the utility because the utility was created
under chapter 163 of the FloridaStatutes and not chapter 196.'007 Appellant
argued that section 163.01(7)(g)(4) of the Florida Statutes specifically
' 1 °°8
provided for exemptions "for entities created by interlocal agreements.
The utility received a tax assessment that did not reflect its exempt status
and filed suit. 1 ° The assessor tried to get the suit dismissed because it was
not filed within sixty days of the assessment. 010 This court held that the
utility was not subject to the sixty-day period of section 194.171(2) of the
Florida Statutes because the lawsuit did not challenge the tax assessment,
the valuation of the property, but rather, only the classification of the
property for valuation purposes.1011
Greater Orlando Aviation Authority v. Crotty.1°I The issue here was
whether a privately
operated hotel, located on municipal property is subject
10 13
to property taxes?
The City of Orlando appealed a judgment in favor of the property
appraiser for Orange County, which ruled that real and personal property
used in the
operation of a hotel on airport property was subject to ad valorem
1 4
taxation. 01
The Greater Orlando Airport Authority (GOAA), an agency of the city
of Orlando, occupied, used, controlled, and operated an airport built on land
owned by the city1015 Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution
made land owned by a municipality exempt from ad valorem taxation under
certain circumstances.101 6 "The trial court ruled that the property was not

1005. Id.
1006. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 163.01 (2001).
1007. Day, 784 So. 2d at 495.
1008. Id.
1009. Id. at 496.
1010.Id.

1011. Id. at 497. Classification at issue was status as a non-exempt governmental entity.

Id.
1012.775 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1013. Id. at 979.
1014.Id.
1015.Id.
1016. Id. at 980.
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l t7
exempt because GOAA was using it for private, profit-making purposes.,
In affirmation of the case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the hotel property did not provide for the comfort,
convenience, safety, and happiness of the citizens of Orlando.' 018 The
purpose of the hotel was to serve persons who resided elsewhere and
required public accommodations. 01 9
The Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre.
The issue was whether
an ad valorem tax exemption is valid when property is being used for a
governmental-proprietary purpose. 121
Appellants got a review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal
of Florida which made a part of section 196.012(6) of the 1994 Florida
Statutes unconstitutional.10 2 The portion that was invalidated would have
created an ad valorem tax exemption for certain private enterprises by
statutorily defining these types of activities as "serv[ing] a governmental,
municipal, or public purpose or function.' 0 23
The appellate court found operation of the raceway to be commercial,
proprietary, profit, and not governmental functions.' 0
The exemptions
covered in the statute deal with "governmental-governmental" uses as
opposed to "governmental-proprietary" uses.' 025 Legislatively deeming a
governmental-proprietary purpose to be a "govemmental-governmental"
purpose did not change its true nature and did not result in the constitutional
awarding of a tax exemption where, absent the legislation, there clearly
could be no exemption. 0 2 It is not for the court or legislature to decide who
shall receive tax exemptions when we have the Florida Constitution by
which to abide.1027
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Todora. ° 2 8 The issue in this case was whether
sales tax should be included in the valuation of property. °29

1017. Crotty, 775 So. 2d at 980.
1018. Id. at 981.
1019.Id.
1020.783 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2001).
1021.Id. at 240.
1022. Id. at 242.
1023.Id.
1024. Id. at 246-47.
1025. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d at 242.
1026. Id.
1027.Id. at 243.
1028.791 So. 2d 29 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1029. Id. at 30.
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This case involved the assessment of tangible personal property used in
The
one of Wal-Mart's stores, such as store fixtures and equipment.
question was whether any sales tax included as part of the original purchase
price of the property, as reported on the tax return, was a "cost of sale" that
must be deducted when determining just valuation. 1 3 1 The appellate court
found no error in the assessment, and Wal-Mart's argument about not
reducing the tax for valuation unavailing. 0 32 Since this court disagreed with
an earlier decision,
it certified the question based on conflict to the Supreme
10 33
Court of Florida.
Wells v. Vallier.10 34 This is a substituted opinion for the earlier
opinion. 10 35 The issue in the case was whether the appellants qualified for
° 36 The trial court granted a
the homestead exemption for property taxes.
0 37
final summary judgment in favor of appellee.1
The appellee's sole reason for denying the homestead exemption tax
deduction to the appellant was that the appellant received a $100 per year

residency based property tax credit in the State of New Hampshire. 8 Other
than receiving the tax credit in New Hampshire, the appellants for the past
sixteen years: 1) have maintained a valid Florida's drivers license; 2) had
one or more motor vehicles registered in Florida; 3) have been registered
voters in Florida; 4) listed their Florida residence as their address for federal

income tax purposes; 5) maintained their primary personal checking and
savings accounts in Florida; 6) have been physically present for an average
of seven to eight months a year; 7) had their primary physicians,
accountants, brokers and church within Florida; 8) maintained family
0 39
keepsakes; and 9) have executed their last will and testament in Florida.
The appellate court held that while a tax credit received in another state
may be a consideration in determining the individual is a permanent resident
of the State of Florida, it alone is not a conclusive determining factor.'=
The appellate court found that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
1030. Id.
1031. Id.
1032. Id. at 31.
1033. Todora,791 So. 2d at 31.
1034.773 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1035.1d. at 1198. For the earlier opinion, see Wells v. Vallier, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
D1280a (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 26, 2000).
1036. Wells, 773 So. 2d at 1198.
1037. Id.
1038. Id.
1039. Wells, 773 So. 2d at 1198.
1040. Id.
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proved that appellants were residents of the State of Florida and have
10 4
complied with the requirements for receiving a homestead tax exemption. '

XXIV. TAX DEEDS
Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Ass'n v. Wires.1 42 The issue in this case
was whether the issuance of a tax deed
to a lot extinguished a homeowner
0 43
association's lien placed on such lot.
The declaration of covenants recorded prior to issuance of the tax deed
permitted the homeowners association to record a lien in its favor for
delinquent payments of homeowner association assessments, pursuant to the
declaration prior to the issuance of the tax deed. ' " The association placed
such a lien on the subject property prior to the tax deed. 10 45
In construing section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes, the appellate
court found "[tihe [legislature could have expressly provided that liens
assessed against lots by homeowners associations also survive the issuance
of a tax deed; however, it did not."' 0
With that, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the appellees.
XXV. TITLE INSURANCE

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Butler.1 4 The issue in this case was
whether certain statutes prohibiting title insurance agents from rebating a
portion of their premiums is unconstitutional. 0 49 The Supreme Court of
Florida after considering the arguments of both sides found the statutes unconstitutional.
The court found the anti-rebate statutes infringed on the
citizens' property rights and unconstitutionally restricted the citizens' rights
to freely bargain for services.105

1041. Id.
1042.766 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1043. ld. at 488.
1044. Id. at 489.
1045. Id. at 488.
1046. Id. at 489.
1047. Wires, 766 So. 2d at 489-90.
1048.770 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2000).
1049. Id.at 1211.
1050. Id.
1051. Id. at 1215.
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XXVI. ZONING

Dixon v. City of Jacksonville.0 5 2 The issue here was whether a hotel is
a proper use consistent with the counties' comprehensive plan when the
hotel is to be built in an area zoned RPI 0 53 Appellants challenged an order
of the circuit court denying appellants' motion for an injunction to prevent
the implementation of an ordinance adopted by appellee, which
0 would have
rezoned certain real property to permit construction of a hotel. Appellee adopted a comprehensive plan for development and later
adopted an ordinance to rezone certain portions of the real property to permit
construction of a hotel on a site.10 55 Appellants tried to get a temporary
and/or permanent injunction to prevent the implementation of the ordinance
and argued that appellee's comprehensive plan for development did not
permit construction of
the hotel at the site.1 56 The trial court denied
10 57
injunction.
appellants'
The appellate court applied the strict scrutiny standard in its review of
the ordinance to see if it was consistent with the comprehensive plan for
development.1 58 The appellate court found that the trial court erred in its
interpretation of appellee's comprehensive plan. 05 9 The appellate court
ruled the hotel was not a proper land use consistent with any type of
permissible use under the comprehensive plan's functional land use
designation.1m
City of Jacksonville Beach v. Car Spa, Inc.1 6 The issue in this case
was whether the city aroperly denied Car Spa, Inc.'s application for a
conditional use permit. 2
Car Spa filed an application for a conditional use permit for a car wash,
automotive service, and gas service facility. 0 63 The staff of the Jacksonville
Beach Planning Commission concluded the use was consistent with relevant
zoning and comprehensive plan policies, and recommended approval with
1052.774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1053. Id. at 764.
1054. Id.
1055. Id.

1056. Id.
1057. Dixon, 774 So. 2d at 764.

1058. Id.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 765-66.
1061.772 So. 2d 630 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

1062. Id.at 631.
1063. Id.
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certain conditions.10
The Commission held a public hearing following
which, the Commission denied the conditional use permit. 10 65 Car Spa filed
a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court alleging that the
application for conditional use, as well as the record of the public hearing,
clearly reflects that all criteria were met by Car Spa's proposed use and that
there was no substantial or competent evidence of any fact proving or even
inferring that the conditional use would be contrary to the public interest.10M
The appellate court reviewed the circuit court's decision based on
whether the circuit court (1) "afforded procedural due process" and (2)
"applied the correct law. 10 67
The circuit court concluded that Car Spa carried its initial burden of
demonstrating entitlement to the conditional use permit, and as a result, the
burden shifted to the city to demonstrate that Car Spa had not satisfied the
relevant code criteria, and that the conditional use requested was, therefore,
contrary to the public interest.1068 The appellate court found that at that
point, the circuit court failed to review the entire record to make its
determination and only used portions of the record, and re-weighed the
evidence, substituting its own judgement for that of the Planning Commission as to the relative weight of the evidence.' 0 69 The appellate court
found that the circuit court rejected testimony of a professional land-use
planner regarding non compliance of the proposed use with the comprehensive plan and that it also rejected testimony of an individual who had
conducted tests to determine whether noise levels associated with the
proposed use violated local noise ordinances.
In addition, the circuit
court failed to include the testimony of neighbors regarding traffic problems
and realtors as to the value of the property. 1 7 The appellate court reversed
72
and remanded the lower court's decision.
Lee v. St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners.10 73 This case
dealt with how long one has to bring an action when there are allegedly
1 74
inconsistent actions which aggrieve a party. 0
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. CarSpa, Inc., 772 So. 2d at 631.
1067. Id. (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)).
1068. Id.
1069. Id. at 631-32.
1070. Id. at 632.
1071. CarSpa, Inc., 772 So. 2d at 632.
1072. Id.
1073.776 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1074. Id. at 1111-12.
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Here, appellee developers filed an application to re-zone land from rural
to a planned urban development, and appellee Board of County
Commissioners re-zoned the land. 10 75 The county zoning agency then
approved appellee's final development plan for the property.0 76 Appellant
requested a review of this aproval
from appellee, which ultimately agreed
°
with the agency's decision.)
Less than thirty days later, appellant filed suit alleging that the rezoning of the property and the order approving the final development plan
were inconsistent with the county's comprehensive plan. 18 The trial court
dismissed the suit as untimely filed. 1 79 On review, the appellate court
reversed. 10 80
The appellate court held that in order to challenge allegedly inconsistent
actions under section 163.3215 of the FloridaStatutes, appellant had to sue
the governmental entity whose actions aggrieved her within thirty days of
such actions. 1 81 Appellant missed the deadlines for the zoning agency's
actions, but her claim as to the appellee board's approval of the development
plan was timely.1082 The court decided that because appellee's board had
the right to review the zoning agency's actions de novo, its decision0 was
the
final one which commenced the running of the thirty day time limit. 83
XVII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected
materials of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems
to be no consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the
survey is useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property
law.

1075.Id. at 1111.
1076.Id.

1077.UL
1078. Lee, 776 So. 2d at 1111-12.
1079. Id. at 1111.
1080. Id.
1081. Id. at 1112.
1082. Id.
1083. Lee, 776 So. 2d at 1113.

